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FOLLOW THE FOOTNOTE OR THE
ADVOCATE AS HISTORIAN OF SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE
Peter Lubin & Dwight Duncan*
Sex as an institution, sex as a general notion, sex as a prob-
lem, sex as a platitude-all this I find too tedious for words. Let
us skip sex.
Vladimir Nabokov, Strong Opinions1
But you're not a girl-you're a guy. Why would a guy want
to marry a guy?
Tony Curtis to Jack Lemmon, Some Like It Ho?
Early in the twentieth century a talented group of Russian literary
critics, known collectively as the Formalists, began to analyze literary
prose as a collection of "devices" that could be isolated, described, un-
derstood, and-by the right student--copied. One of these Formalist
critics, Viktor Shklovsky, developed the theory of "art as device" in his
study "Iskusstvo kak Priyom (Art as Device)",3 in which he famously
analyzed the technique of "making strange" (ostranenie). In "making
strange," a writer, according to Shklovsky, would take the familiar, the
ordinary, the taken-for-granted, and describe it as if seen for the first
time.4 The writer thus removes the cobwebs of cliche and convention, all
the words and responses on tap, and makes each of us into a Miranda es-
pying Ferdinand for the first time. Everything we may take for
granted-weather vanes, Walmart, window displays, and even wedding
* Peter Lubin and Dwight Duncan are both Associate Professors of Law at Southern New
England School of Law. The authors would like to acknowledge with gratitude the assis-
tance of Philip Cleary, Crystal Ferreira, Edward Greer, James Hayes, James Janda, Korin
Munsterman, David Prentiss, Martina Santos, Steven Sharek, and Clark R. Whaley in the
preparation of this article.
1. VLADIMIR NABOKOV, STRONG OPINIONs 23 (1973).
2. SOME LIKE IT HOT (United Artists 1959).
3. The essay "Iskusstvo kak Priyom" appears in Shklovsky's early work "0 Teorii
prozy," Knigoizdatel'stvo Gelikon, Moskva, 1929.
4. See Gary Kern, Introduction to BORIS EIKHENBAUM, THE YOUNG TOLSTOI ix
(Gary Kern ed., Ardis 1972) (explaining that the Russian practice of ostranenie, or "mak-
ing strange," was predicated on the assumption that "perception can be awakened only by
altering the stimulus, distorting it, transferring it to unaccustomed surroundings, making it
strange again").
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vows between a man and a woman-suddenly can be endowed with a
sense of the unfamiliar, the strange, the bizarre.
One locus classicus for the Formalists is Tolstoy's description, in War
and Peace, of Natasha attending the opera for the first time. A more re-
cent example is in Vladimir Nabokov's description of a pencil sharpener,
"that highly satisfying, highly philosophical implement that goes ticon-
deroga-ticonderoga, feeding on the yellow finish and sweet wood, and
ends up in a soundlessly spinning ethereal void as we all must."6 Here,
advocates of unusual practices, as yet unaccepted by the broad mass of
humanity, sometimes indulge in a rhetorical strategy that can be de-
scribed as "making strange" in reverse. That is, advocates attempt to
familiarize what normally would be seen as strange, as not only familiar,
but also an acceptable and plausible part of the moral life we ought to
take for granted. This "making strange" in reverse is evident in recent
efforts by homosexual propagandists, including historians, journalists,
and professors of law, to convince us that same-sex marriage is not an
exotic rarity, a kind of behavioral hapax legomenon, but something that
always has existed in many societies. In this view, from China to Peru,
you find examples of same-sex marriage recognized by the circumambi-
ent society.8 Only one small part of humanity, that affected by certain
5. See R. F. CHRISTIAN, TOLSTOY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 144-45 (1969).
Professor Christian describes Tolstoy's use of the device of "making strange" thus:
Shklovsky regarded Tolstoy as an exponent of "the device of making it
strange," [sic] which meant, simply speaking, removing a word or object from its
conventional context, calling it by a different name, refusing to recognise it, pre-
tending it is something else, doing anything with it, in fact, to rescue it from being
a verbal clichd with no power to evoke a response. Perhaps the classic example of
this "device"-this ironical oversimplification as I would call it-is the descrip-
tion of the opera in Moscow as seen through Natasha's eyes, which begins:
"The floor of the stage consisted of smooth boards, at the sides was some
painted cardboard representing trees, and at the back was a cloth stretched
over boards. In the centre of the stage sat some girls in red bodices and
white skirts. One very fat girl in a white silk dress sat apart on a low bench,
to the back of which a piece of green cardboard was glued. They all sang
something ....
To Natasha, newly arrived from the country, the artificiality of operatic
convention seemed ludicrous and grotesque, and these deflationary sen-
tences with their ironical naYvetd well convey her mood."
Id. (quoting LEO TOLSTOY, WAR AND PEACE II, 5,9).
6. VLADIMIR NABOKOV, PNIN 69 (1989)
7. See Andrew Sullivan, Introduction to Whose Life Is It Anyway? The Real World
of Love and Marriage, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON 295 (Andrew Sullivan
ed., 1997) (insisting that "[s]ame-sex marriage exists in life, it simply doesn't exist in law").
8. See JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE XXVI (1994)
("Many cultures other than Western ones have recognized and institutionalized same-sex
unions-Japanese warriors in early modern times, Chinese men and women under the
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ideas stemming largely from Judaism and Christianity, has been seem-
ingly unreceptive to the idea.9
Even within the Christian West, the most famous of these advocates,
the late John Boswell, Professor of History at Yale, claimed to have
found a "secret history" of such acceptance. In two books, Same-Sex
Unions in Premodern Europe,0 and Christianity, Social Tolerance, and
Homosexuality," Boswell purportedly discovered that same-sex mar-
riages had existed within Christian Europe, particularly before the thir-
12teenth century. He even adduced evidence of solemn Church ceremo-
nies for the act of adelphopoiesis, or "brother-making," that bound man
to man in marriage. 3
Many reviewers originally greeted Boswell's work as unassailable. 4 As
time passed, however, especially since Boswell's death, his work seems to
have lost much of its luster. A second look has been taken, not least by
homosexual advocates unwilling to have their case made sloppily, and by
Yuan and Ming dynasties, Native Americans from a number of tribes (mostly before white
domination), many African tribes well into the twentieth century, and residents (both
male and female) of the Middle East, South-East Asia, Russia, other parts of Asia, and
South America.").
9. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM
SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 35 (1996) ("[M]odern Western culture is
peculiarly hostile toward same-sex unions.").
10. JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY:
GAY PEOPLE IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA TO
THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY (1980).
11. JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE (1994).
12. See BOSWELL, supra note 10, at 281. Boswell argued that despite a kind of delib-
erate inattention, until the mid-thirteenth century, the Church was not seriously opposed
to homosexual practice, either on biblical, patristic, or historical grounds. See id at 162-
261. He asserted that the reality of such same-sex unions sanctioned by the Christian
Church constitutes a kind of "secret history" that is only now being revealed because, as
Boswell says, "I discovered it." See id. at 281.
13. See id. at 19-20, 178-79.
14. Reviewers used such phrases as "remarkable," "truly ground breaking," "work of
unrelenting scholarship and high drama," and "revolutionary challenge to some of West-
ern culture's most familiar moral assumptions." These phrases are taken from Martin
Duberman, Paul Robinson, and Jean Strouse, and are found on the back of the paperback
edition of Boswell's CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY. The
reviews from which the phrases are taken appeared in THE NEW REPUBLIC, THE NEW
YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW, and NEWSWEEK, respectively. Boswell's second and even
bolder effort in this vein, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE, received similar
acclaim, though a few dour souls among the historians and philologists refused to be buf-
faloed, including Brent Shaw in THE NEW REPUBLIC and Daniel Mendelsohn in ARION
(Fall 1995-Winter 1996). For a full list of the reviews of Boswell's work, see Paul Halsall,
People With a History: An Online Guide to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Tran History: John
Boswell Page (visited July 21, 1998) (referring to the two reviews as highly critical of Bos-
well's book, Same-Sex Unions in Premodern Europe). http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/pwh
/index-bos.html#reviews [hereinafter People With a History].
Catholic University Law Review
now a great deal of Boswell's edifice lies in ruins. 5
Since Boswell, the most tireless scholarly advocate of same-sex mar-
riage has been Professor William Eskridge, heretofore known chiefly for
his work in constitutional law and statutory interpretation. 6 In a recent
work, entitled The Case for Same-Sex Marriage, based partly on a pre-
viously published law review article he had written," Professor Eskridge
went far beyond Boswell. Instead of limiting his analysis to the Judeo-
Christian West in his attempt to find a sturdy tradition of same-sex mar-
riage, Eskridge went far afield-as far as the North American Indian
tribes, the inhabitants of West Africa, the putative traditions of To-
kugawa Japan, and other civilizations remote in time, or space, or both,
from contemporary American culture. 9 Boswell had stumbled badly in
his attempt to reclaim the Western Christian tradition for same-sex mar-
riage and Eskridge had learned from that.2" In his own writing, Eskridge
was careful to dissociate himself rhetorically from much of Boswell's
claims.2 Indeed, Boswell's efforts proved useful as a foil by which Esk-
ridge assured the reader that his own scholarship was far more sober, ju-
dicious and reliable.
Arguments exist that might be made on behalf of same-sex marriage
that do not rely on an appeal to history. Many practices condoned in the
past, such as cannibalism or slavery, now offend our moral sense. Advo-
cates of same-sex marriage could denounce the historic practice of nar-
row-mindedly confining a certain legal and moral status, marriage, to a
15. Two of the most critical, and damaging, reviews have been by openly declared
homosexuals, Brent Shaw and Daniel Mendelsohn. See Halsall, People With a History,
supra note 14.
16. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY (1993);
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
17. ESKRIDGE, supra note 9.
18. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV.
1419 (1993).
19. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 29-30 (characterizing woman-woman marriages
among Native American cultures as a significant feature that enabled women to obtain a
higher social status).
20. See id.
21. See id. at 27 (noting that, with respect to Boswell's assertion that ceremonial prac-
tices involving same-sex marriages was evidence that ordinary Christians recognized these
unions as "marriages" during the Middle Ages, criticisms characterizing this argument as
"tendentious" "strike me as firm but not conclusive"). Moreover, Eskridge also acknowl-
edged that critics justifiably had charged Boswell with misinterpreting many of his source
materials that supposedly supported the world-wide acceptance of same-sex marriage as a
historic institution. See id. at 27 n.37 (stating that allegations of misinterpretation have
"been repeatedly and persuasively made against Boswell's earlier work").
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couple made up of one man and one woman, and in so doing exhibit that
relaxed, easygoing, sophisticated tolerance that bien pensants believe
they must continuously strive to achieve. But that is not the argument
Professor Eskridge wishes to make. Like Boswell, he is keenly inter-
ested not in claiming a new understanding, and approval, of same-sex
unions, but rather in appealing to history and to the claim that such un-
ions have, in many societies, received the official recognition and ap-
proval that Western civilization willfully continues to withhold.
I. ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE
For our purposes, the critical chapter in Eskridge's book is the second,
A History of Same-Sex Marriage.22 It may at first impress the unwary, but
if we follow the footnotes stolidly, Eskridge's insight undazzles and dims.
The chapter begins:
We'wha was an important cultural and political leader in the
Zuni community in the late nineteenth century. At one point
he served as an emissary from that southwestern Native Ameri-
can nation to Washington, D.C. He was the strongest, wisest,
and most esteemed member of his community. And he was a
berdache, a male who dressed in female garb. Such men were
revered in Zuni culture for their supposed connection to the su-
pernatural... Ifeyinwa Olinke lived in the nineteenth century
as well. She was a member of the Igbo tribe, situated in what is
now eastern Nigeria. She was an industrious and wealthy
woman in a community where most of the entrepreneurial op-
portunities were seized by women. Ifeyinwa socially overshad-
owed her less prosperous male husband. As a sign of her pros-
perity and social standing, she herself became a female husband
to other women. Indeed, the epithet Olinke refers to the fact
that she had nine wives.2
Only after presenting these two strangely mystifying, as yet undevel-
oped and incomplete, bits of anecdotal evidence, transporting us to the
farther, as well as wilder, shores of love, does Professor Eskridge resume
his own narrative flow and explains what he is about:
This chapter presents a minihistory of same-sex unions. To
the modern Western mind it is surprising how common same-
sex unions and even marriages have been in other times and
other cultures. While there has been plenty of anxiety about
these unions as well, they have at least been tolerated in most
22. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 15.
23. Id (footnotes omitted).
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societies--except in Western society since the thirteenth cen-
tury. I shall leave it to others to argue why the West became
and remained intolerant for so long. Instead, I only wish to put
to rest the argument that same-sex marriage is somehow so un-
natural or dysfunctional as to be unheard of. Hear of it now.2
Professor Eskridge's introduction prompts several observations. First,
the rhetoric paints the desired picture: the narrow-minded, uninformed
"modern Western mind" that discovers to its surprise "how common
same-sex unions and even marriages have been." " Where? "[I]n other
times and other cultures., 26 There is sleight of word: the slippery slide
from "same-sex unions" to "even marriages," a slide which turns out to
be characteristic of the entire chapter, with the word "union" being fre-
quently and carelessly employed as a synonym of "marriage., 27 Eskridge
maintains that the "intolerant" West needs to understand that same-sex
marriage is not "so unnatural or dysfunctional as to be unheard of."
'
This is a red herring. To the contrary, no one has ever argued that same-
sex marriages are "unheard of." Rather, it has been argued only that the
world's major civilizations, and most of its minor ones, have not con-
ferred upon same-sex unions the status of marriage as that has been un-
derstood in each of those civilizations. In fact, many civilizations are fa-
miliar with some famous same-sex "marriages" in history, including those
of such self-indulgent and crazed rulers as Nero and Elagabalus
Eskridge carefully selected the two paragraphs with which he opened
this chapter. By opening with what appears to be anecdotal evidence,
citing the practices of two societies that to the Western reader will be ex-
otic, remote, and above all little-known-the Zunis and the Igbo-Esk-
ridge simultaneously accomplishes several objectives. First, he impresses
those who are easy to impress. Second, he immediately shifts attention
away from major and important world civilizations to the less significant
ones, the tangential, the small societies on the margin. Third, he can op-
erate with impunity, knowing that few will take the trouble to refute that
which would require special effort, such as reviewing his sources on
We'wha or on "female husbands" in West Africa. The modern reader is
24. Id. at 16.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. "Marriage" itself, that can mean very different things depending on time and
place, is never clearly defined or distinguished from "union."
28. Id.
29. See SUETONIUs, THE LIVES OF THE TWELVE CAESARS 258 (Joseph Gavorse ed.
& trans., 1931) (discussing Nero); EDWARD GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE
AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 168 (1994) (discussing Elagabalus).
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more inclined to let his glazed eyes glance over the appropriate footnote,
and to accept uncritically and incrementally each morsel of proferred
authority. Bullied by footnotes, the reader's critical faculties surrender
without a fight.
II. NECESSARY DRUDGERY: WE'WHA THE ZUNI
In evaluating Eskridge's work, the task is to look steadily and thor-
oughly at each passage and each source, and to refuse to be inveigled by
sleight of word. At times, such careful scrutiny will be tedious, but there
is no other way to rebut such a reckless catalogue of presumptions. First,
consider the initial reference to the Zuni We'wha 0 Even being told that
We'wha was a berdache puts the reader at a disadvantage because of the
obscurity of the term. A "berdache," we learn, is "a male who dressed in
female garb."3 Both the chapter heading and context lead one to believe
that the "berdache" was necessarily homosexual; however, this turns out
not to be true. 2 We assume also that since the chapter is about "same-
sex marriage," We'wha, of course, will have entered into such a mar-
riage, duly recognized by the Zuni tribe. So it comes as some surprise to
read that Professor Eskridge's authority for the story of We'wha is a re-
cent book, entitled The Zuni Man-Woman by Will Roscoe.33 At no point
in that book is We'wha described as having been in a recognized "mar-
riage." It is true that We'wha was a berdache and likely a homosexual.
M
But the story of We'wha is evidence only of the fact that in Zuni culture,
men who preferred to dress as women and to perform women's tasks had
available a socially sanctioned role that allowed them to live and function
according to these desires. In other words, the evidence suggests only
that among the Zuni Indians (assuming that all berdaches were homo-
sexual), homosexuals played a social role.3M Moreover, the evidence indi-
cates that at least one particular berdache, We'wha, acquired a certain
celebrity, even in the white man's world, and was respected within his
30. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 15.
31. Id at 15. "Berdache" is a phoenetic and semantic corruption of the Arabic "bar-
dash," which is a synonym for a catamite or an urning.
32. See id; see also Charles Callender and Lee M. Kochems, The North American
Berdache, in 24 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 443, 449-51 (Aug.-Oct. 1983) (providing an
authoritative survey of the state of knowledge about the berdache phenomenon, and not-
ing that "the assumption that berdaches were homosexual is oversimplified. Like their
other attributes, sexual behavior was variable and very complex.").
33. WILL ROSCOE, THE ZUNI MAN-WOMAN (1991).
34. See id. at 5, 125.
35. See id at 5, 24-28, 125, 168-69.
36. See id. at 2, 53-66, 69-73, 98, 126.
19981 1277
Catholic University Law Review
tribe.37
The Zuni Man-Woman turns out to be a work of unusual provenance.
Its author, Will Roscoe, is described on the book jacket as "the editor of
Living the Spirit. a Gay American Indian Anthology," and as a member
of the Gay Indian Alliance.3" Roscoe notes in his acknowledgments that
he "ha[s] been genuinely honored by the trust placed in [him] by the
GAI [Gay American Indian] Board of Directors" and "would like to
honor the memory of ... three openly gay American Indians who lived
and died in service to their communities."39 Roscoe putatively "tells for
the first time the story of the U.S. government's concerted but ultimately
ineffective efforts to change Indian 'morals' and suppress berdaches.
Today the berdache tradition has been undergoing a surprising renewal
among contemporary gay American Indians."' ° In the end, Roscoe's
book turns out to be a brief for berdacherie. Given Roscoe's self-
declared allegiances, one may assume that if there were any solid evi-
dence of Zuni (or other American Indian) approval of same-sex mar-
riage, he would have eagerly presented it. Yet a close reading of the
more than 200 pages of Roscoe's book reveals only that:
the Zuni berdache engaged in many behaviors inconsistent
with the "role and status of the opposite sex." To begin with,
We'wha participated in both male and female economic pur-
suits .... In the area of religion, We'wha also participated in
male roles. He was an active member of the male kachina soci-
ety. He recited prayers and legends on ceremonial occasions
and folk tales on informal occasions-also male roles .... [H]e
[also] made prayer sticks, another male activity.
We learn further that "We'wha engaged in both male and female eco-
nomic pursuits., 42 We learn about naming customs among the Zuni,
Zuni concepts of individual development, and We'wha's "immersion into
the white world" in cultural preservation, economic development, and
cross-cultural relations.43 Most of all, we have a great deal of musing on
the subject of the tyranny of categorization. Grimly fixing people as het-
ero- or homosexual, Roscoe says, ignores the fluidity of categories which
37. See id. at 69-71.
38. See ROSCOE, supra note 33, book jacket.
39. Id. at xix.
40. Id. at book jacket.
41. Id. at 126.
42. Id. at 127.
43. Id. at 203; see also id. at 195-214 (providing a detailed account of the development
of the berdache tradition).
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are, he insists, questions of "social construction." The "social construc-
tion of sexuality" is, bien entendu, an unavoidable and nearly omnipres-
ent theme in much recent academic writing in literature and history.45
The flavor of Roscoe's prose and the quality of his thought are captured
nicely by this self-parodying paragraph on such a theme:
The single-dimensional Western category of homosexuality
is an historical construct. It would be ironic indeed if this cate-
gory were used to exclude data on sex and gender variance in
other cultures from the current discourse on the meaning of
homosexual identity. Such an approach is inherently ethnocen-
tric, for it privileges Western definitions at the expense of non-
Western insights. Rather than trying to fit berdaches into his-
torically relative categories, our inquiries ought to use the ex-
ample of the berdache to improve these categories and free
them of their cultural bias."'
"Historical construct," "discourse," "ethnocentric," "privileges" as a
verb, "insights," "cultural bias"-all of this hand-me-down but perhaps
still modish vocabulary is employed to suggest the existence of a world in
which everything can be seen as something else, where what we call
"homosexual" and "heterosexual" can vary according to the circumam-
bient culture. Thus, "terms like gay and homosexual are not discrete
categories with fixed boundaries as determined by agencies of social con-
trol. Their meaning is subject to intense dispute and negotiation within a
discourse too volatile to allow prediction of the eventual consensus# 7
We'wha may not even with certainty be described as homosexual. Af-
ter all, there exist heterosexual males who prefer female roles even in
our society. According to two leading authorities on this subject, some
American Indians became berdaches because they were afraid of the role
of warrior and hunter; berdacherie may have been a means of avoiding
certain dangers." However inspirational the story of We'wha may be,
44. Id. at 207-11 (arguing that Western classifications such as "homosexual" and
"gay" do not correlate to the roles played by the berdache who shared some of the be-
havioral characteristics).
45. One of the classic works of the genre is DAVID GREENBERG, THE
CONSTRUcTION OF HOMOSEXUALITY (1988).
46. ROSCOE, supra note 33, at 211.
47. Id. at 210.
48. See Callender & Kochems, supra note 32, at 448 (noting that "[blerdache status is
often described as a sanctuary for males who were unable or unwilling to accept the role of
warrior"). The practices of berdaches were occasionally interpreted as a sign of disgrace
that was imposed on cowardly males. See id. at 443. Moreover, "[tlhis practice did not
exist among some societies in the upper Midwest." Id. Callender & Kochems cite to an
extensive list of authorities, among them some of the most celebrated anthropologists. See
19981 1279
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there simply is no evidence presented that he was ever part of a same-sex
marriage, and hence cannot be made to represent an assumed Zuni ac-
ceptance of such an arrangement.
III. NECESSARY DRUDGERY: AMONG THE IGBO
Eskridge's second paragraph is more exotic than his first; the Igbo of
West Africa are even less familiar to us than the Zuni. This paragraph
mentions the taking of a "female husband" by an Igbo widow 9.4  A
reader's natural inclination is to assume that if the phrase "female hus-
band" is used, then a relationship between female and "female husband,"
akin to that between female and male in an ordinary heterosexual mar-
riage, is clearly implied. Such a marriage, one would assume, should
normally include sexual relations. Yet Eskridge's source for the life of
Ifeyinwa is Male Daughters, Female Husbands: Gender and Sex in an Af-
rican Society by Ifi Amadiume.5 According to Amadiume, however, in
Igbo society there is no real effacing of gender and sex, as the book's title
suggests, and as Eskridge's use of the "female husband" story more than
insinuates.5' In Igbo tradition, "males and females were physically and
ideologically distanced."52 Amadiume also notes that "[t]he sexual divi-
sion of space between men and women was so strong that not even 'male
daughters' might break the rule."53 In Igbo society, having children is
central to status, the basis for everything:
Men and women were talked of or judged according to the
roles expected of them as full social adults, that is, according to
their status as fathers and mothers.
What was stressed about men was their duty to provide for
and protect their families ....
Bad women were those who failed in their wifely and mater-
nal duties and sentiments 4
The traditional Igbo society was not unsettled about sex. Amadiume
explained it this way:
id. at 444. Callender & Kochems do not, however, agree with those writers' concept of
berdachehood as such a "sanctuary" for all the tribes they have studied, but note that "[i]ts
frequent equation with homosexuality, even by explicitly gay writers, distorts the sexual
aspects of berdachehood." Id. at 444 (internal citation omitted).
49. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 15.
50. IFA AMADIUME, MALE DAUGHTERS, FEMALE HUSBANDS: GENDER AND SEX
IN AFRICAN SOCIETY (1987).
51. Id. at 92.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 93.
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The likening of a woman to a breakable plate reflects in-
digenous ideas about male and female sexuality, which sup-
ported the socio-cultural significance made of the female bio-
logical process .... [T]his culture stigmatized pregnancy before
marriage, [and] the socialization of girls stressed sexual restraint
and preparation for their future roles as wives and mothers."
And what of the "female husbands" on which Eskridge places such
significance? According to his footnoted source, the book by Ifi Amadi-
une, here is what the institution of a "female husband" is all about:
The second son of Ada Eze stated that as his mother was a
very wealthy woman, she acquired a wife. According to him, it
was Ada Eze who married the woman before she was inherited
by Ada Eze's son, Obiora.
Two explanations were given to me as to why Ada Eze ac-
quired a wife. 1) was a matter of status and prestige; she was a
very wealthy woman and an aristocrat, therefore she acquired a
wife; 2) was a matter of necessity. Things had changed. All her
sons had left to seek employment and live in the urban centres.
The daughters had left for their husbands' homes, some of
which were not even in Nnobi. Consequently, she was alone and
without help; therefore some of her children, especially the
daughters, decided that she should acquire a wife. Her last
daughter, now a woman in her sixties, recounted how they went
to a neighbouring town to acquire a wife. According to her, it
was a quick business and very little money was paid to acquire
rights over the very young girl.56
This passage is critical because it indicates that the "female husband"
has little in common with the "male husband." She is simply a wealthy,
heterosexual widow who acquires someone in her household to fulfill the
roles both of domestic servant and of companion or dame de compagnie.
This "wife" performs household chores and keeps the mistress company.
But there is neither a hint of a sexual relationship, nor one in which
adopted children could be raised-both of which are implicated when we
talk of same-sex marriage.
Igbo informants have stated that the idea of the "female husband"
never includes any sexual aspect. 7 Among those informants is Mr.
Augustine Nzenwa, the eldest son of a prominent member of the
Olokoro clan from Umiagata in Abia State. Nzenwa has confirmed that
the taking of a wife by a "female husband" is still practiced in Nigeria,
55. Id. at 94.
56. Id. at 129.
57. See id.
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and that our understanding is the correct one." Specifically, Nzenwa tes-
tifies that this is an entirely asexual relationship and one where the
phrase "female husband" must be interpreted broadly." A female who is
barren may take a "wife" in order to have her produce a male heir for
reasons of property settlement.6 The father's identity will then be of lit-
tle consequence, or she may take a wife for company and, as Nzenwa
puts it, "to do errands, because a man cannot do errands for a woman.,
61
In other words, the "female husband" takes a young girl "in order to
have her produce a male heir" or "for company" or to "do errands."
None of this is evidence that the Igbo culture tolerates same-sex mar-
riages of the sort Professor Eskridge contemplates. In fact, according to
Augustine Nzenwa, "homosexuality is absolutely taboo in Igbo society,
not even discussed." 62 Notwithstanding the irrelevance of both the Igbo
"female husband" and of the story of We'wha, Professor Eskridge does
not quite claim these stories as direct support for his thesis that same-sex
marriage has been widely accepted. But note his misleading comments
after he introduces us to the "stories" of We'wha and Ifeyinwa Olinke,
stories that:
[r]esonate strangely in modern American minds. Most twenti-
eth century Americans consider marriage to be an institution
that intrinsically involves different-rather than same-sex-
partners. While numerous Americans are willing to tolerate
same-sex relationships, and even to sanction them to some ex-
tent, few consider them to be marriages. In contrast, historians,
social anthropologists, and scholars of comparative literature
have been writing about same-sex unions and marriages for
most of this century, with a boomlet in the last two decades.
Though few critics like to admit it, same sex marriages are a
commonplace in human history and have served civilizing func-
tions, providing couples with social support and integrating
them into the larger culture.63
IV. OUT OF AFRICA
Later in the chapter Professor Eskridge returns to explore Africa and
deliberately darkens the sky of his prose with willful obnubilation. He
58. Interview with Augustine Nzenwa (July 24, 1997).
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 16.
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claims, and simultaneously is forced to disclaim, "initiatory unions" as
part of his catalogue of same-sex unions.6 He describes, for example, the
"mummy-baby" games among young Basotho girls in Lesotho:
Same-sex relationships have also frequently served as social
or even sexual initiations prefatory to marriage. An interesting
example is the "mummy-baby" games among Basotho girls in
Lesotho. In contrast to women in many other African societies,
those in Lesotho are particularly vulnerable, both economically
and socially, because they are dependent on males who tend to
be employed as migrant workers. For these women, relation-
ships outside of marriage serve as important support networks,
and young girls are initiated into such relationships beginning
with mummy-baby games played in their grade school years. In
a mummy-baby relationship, an older girl, acting as "mummy,"
develops an intimate, maternal association with a younger one,
the baby. Typically, the mummy presents gifts to the baby who
reciprocates by obeying and respecting the mummy. The two
share emotional and informational exchanges and are physi-
cally, and sometimes sexually, intimate. Rather than displacing
marriage, these relationships help to prepare younger girls for
marriage, including its rockier moments. Scholars have docu-
mented similar female-female friendships in other African so-
cieties.65
What is the relevance of any of this to the notion that same-sex mar-
riage is accepted around the world? There is none. Professor Eskridge
has simply described a kind of play-acting that pre-adolescent Basotho
girls engage in, clearly involving development, and expression of the ma-
ternal instinct." Moreover, "[r]ather than displacing marriage, these re-
lationships help to prepare younger girls for marriage. '6 7 In other words,
contrary to Professor Eskridge's view, Basotho girls grow up and enter
into heterosexual marriages-the only kind their society recognizes."
These practices are irrelevant to the case he would like to make.
Having adumbrated the theme of "woman marriage" with the "story"
of Ifeyinwa Olinke, Eskridge develops it more fully, exploring other
parts of Africa later in the chapter,69 where he relies heavily on the work
of Eileen Jensen Krige:
64. See id. at 32-33.
65. See id. (footnotes omitted).
66. See id.
67. See id. at 33.
68. See id. at 33-35.
69. See id.
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A form of same-sex union that may be unique to African cul-
tures is the institution of "woman marriage."... [Yet] [this] in-
stitution was not given serious attention until anthropologists
Eileen Jensen Krige and Melville Herskovits publicized it in the
1930s. The following is an early description of woman marriage
among the Nuer of Sudan:
What seems to us, but not at all to the Nuer, a somewhat
strange union is that in which a woman marries another woman
and counts as the pater [father] of the children born of the wife.
Such marriages are by no means uncommon in Nuerland, and
they must be regarded as a form of simple legal marriage, for
the woman-husband marries her wife in exactly the same way as
a man marries a woman .... We may perhaps refer to this kind
of union as woman-marriage.
A woman who marries in this way is generally barren, and
for this reason counts in some respects as a man .... [I]f she is
rich she may marry several wives. She is their legal husband
and can demand damages if they have relations with men with-
out her consent. She is the pater [father] of their children, and
on the marriages of their daughters she receives the cattle which
go to the father's side in the distribution of bridewealth. Her
children are called after her, as though she were a man, and I
was told that they address her as "father."7
Had Eskridge quoted more fully, he might have noted that Krige de-
scribes "woman marriage" as "a last resort in raising a male heir to per-
petuate the name and inherit the property of a man."'" Moreover, Esk-
ridge disregarded Krige's description of woman marriages as a political
and social vehicle to achieving greater stability. Krige suggests that
woman marriage is "closely bound up with rights and duties arising from
the social structure" of the culture and is a "flexible institution that can
be utilized in a number of different ways to meet a number of different
situations."" When Eskridge enlists Krige in his argument, he down-
plays, though he cannot completely ignore, the fact that "in African cul-
tures where women occupy a high position and can acquire property or
other forms of wealth, woman marriage is one way that a woman may
strengthen her economic position and establish her household. 7 4 In con-
70. Id. at 33-34 (footnotes omitted).
71. Eileen Jensen Krige, Woman-Marriage, with Special Reference to the Lovedu-Its
Significance for the Definition of Marriage, in 44 AFRICA 11,29 (1974).
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 34.
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trast, Eskridge's agenda involves sex, not the disposition of property.
Additionally, Professor Eskridge makes free, too free with such words
as "common" and "usual" to support the assertion that "[w]oman mar-
riages were common in Africa."75 Well, are they? Where? And what
are woman marriages? Eskridge supports this astonishing claim by stat-
ing that: "The term female husband.., refers to a woman who takes on
the legal and social roles of husband and father by marrying another
woman according to the approved rules and ceremonies of her society...
[and] she may belong to any one of over 30 African populations."76 But,
the point is this: there is no sexual element involved in these marriages.
Rather, the word "marriage" is only a verbal crutch, employed, in the ab-
sence of another term, to describe a relationship that in its most signifi-
cant aspect differs from real marriage, not only as it is understood in the
West, but as it is understood in the various African societies. Krige and
Herskovitz call this "a somewhat strange union," but make use of the
word that comes most immediately to hand, "marriage. 77 In their case,
it was an innocent groping for a word, with a full understanding that
"marriage" was a greatly imperfect and hasty verbal solution. Only a
careless scholar, however, would efface the central distinction between
this kind of "marriage" and "marriage" as it is commonly understood in
the East. While not all heterosexual marriages involve sexual activity,
such a marriage implies the possibility, and even the likelihood. Yet
Eskridge avoids confronting the essential truth that African woman-
woman "marriages" do not involve sexual activity.
A leading investigator in African anthropology, Professor Regina
Oboler, notes that the "basic institution of woman-woman marriage is
widespread in African patrilineal societies."78  However, Oboler also
notes that "[a] female husband is a woman who pays brideswealth for,
and thus marries (but does not have sexual intercourse with) another
woman."79 The logical conclusion is that in African woman marriage, it is
property, not sexual behavior, and certainly not a putative socially sanc-
tioned tolerance for this or that sexual practice, that is the crux. Profes-
sor Oboler's study of the Nandi of Kenya reinforces what we find among
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Melville Herskovitz, A Note on "Woman Marriage" in Dahomey, in 10 AFRICA
335 (1937); Krige, supra note 71.
78. Regina Smith Oboler, Is the Female Husband a Man? Woman/Woman Marriage
Among the Nandi of Kenya, in 19 ETHNOLOGY 69, 69 (1980); see also ESKRIDGE, supra
note 9, at 34 ("Woman marriages were common in Africa."); Krige, supra note 71, at 11
(noting that woman marriages are prevalent in many African cultures).
79. Oboler, supra note 78, at 69.
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the Igbo of West Africa:
[T]he key to the question of the female husband's gender lies
in her relationship to the property that is transmitted through
her to the sons of her wife .... [L]et it be said that it is an ex-
tremely important canon of Nandi ideology that the most sig-
nificant property and primary means of production-livestock
and, in the modem setting, land-should be held and managed
exclusively by men .... [T]he strength of the female husband's
identification as a male is dependent on the social context in
which the identification is made. In contexts which directly im-
plicate the issues of property and heirship, Nandi informants
are unanimous in considering it of the utmost importance to in-
sist that the female husband is a man and behaves in exact ac-
cordance with the ideal model of the male role. Such areas are
the management of family property, legitimate authority over
the wife and children and the responsibility to provide for the
wife and children in a material sense. The further one moves
away from these issues into other aspects of the cultural defini-
tion of the male role the weaker become both the female hus-
band's own attempts to conform to male role behavior and in-
formants' dogmatic insistence that they in fact do so. To say
that a female husband is a man in certain contexts but not in
others lends a degree of clarity to the situation which is not pre-
sent in fact."
As with the Igbo, a reader can see that the Nandi "woman-woman
marriage" is very different from the "same-sex marriage" referenced by
Professor Eskridge. The African variety, whether among the Igbo,
Nandi, Bantu, or the Nuer, has nothing to do with sexual activity and
everything to do with preserving property rights through what Shake-
speare calls the "primogenity and due of birth.""1
Professor Eskridge's discussion of "woman marriage" willfully disre-
gards what his own sources reveal about the absence of a sexual compo-
nent. Eskridge must have known that the Nandi women who took fe-
male wives did not have sexual activity with them and that "[t]he
motivation of a woman who becomes a female husband is fairly clear-cut;
it is the acquisition of a male heir for her property."82 Furthermore, he
must have read Amadiume's account of the elderly Igbo widow who
"was alone and without help: therefore some of her children, especially
80. Id. at 70.
81. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TROILUS AND CRESSIDA, act 1, sc. 3.
82. See Oboler, supra note 78, at 74.
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the daughters, decided that she should acquire a wife."' Because Esk-
ridge makes such a rhetorical fetish of his careful use of the evidence (in
putative contradistinction to Boswell), he should have transmitted such
findings in his sources and then proceeded either to discuss them, at-
tempt to refute them, or accept them but argue that, in any case, such
woman-woman "marriages" at least indicate an openness to other possi-
bilities. Instead, he reads selectively, and hence misreads, his sources.
With regard to man-man "marriages" in Africa, Eskridge's use of his
sources is equally worrisome. He writes of the "functional union... in-
volv[ing] pair bonding in military settings. Many societies have institu-
tionalized same-sex relationships, akin to the Achilles-Patroclus and Gil-
gamesh-Enkidu relationships of ancient myth, among warriors or
soldiers. ' And in Africa he finds a number of such military pair bond-
ings.
This attempt to enroll celebrated literary characters, the Iliad, and the
Gilgamesh epics in his argument, is bizarre. Instead of ineluctably inter-
preting the relationship of Patroclus and Achilles as one involving homo-
sexual love, for example, we might with as great justification note that
Achilles' wrath originates with his fury at having a slave girl, Briseis,
taken from him by Agamemnon. 5 Is there not at least a plausible argu-
ment that this could be evidence of Achilles' heterosexuality?
Eskridge's discussion of such "functional unions" in fact, not fiction, is
equally unsatisfactory. He finds the following as the most convincing ex-
ample of such "military wives" among the Azande in southern Sudan:
The warrior tradition epitomized by the samurai can be illus-
trated in African cultures even more vividly. E.E. Evans-
Pritchard documented the institution of "boy wives" for mili-
tary men among the Azande in what is now Sudan. The
Azande considered the relationship a marriage both legally and
culturally. The warrior paid bride-price (some five spears or
more) to the parents of his boy and performed services for them
as he would have done had he married their daughter (if he
proved to be a good son-in-law they might later replace the son
by a daughter). Also, if another man had relations with his boy,
he could sue him at court for adultery. The warrior addressed
the boy as diare (wife), and the boy addressed the warrior as
kumbami (husband). The relationship was both sexual (the
warrior would have intercourse with the boy between his
83. See AMADIUME, supra note 50, at 129.
84. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 30.
85. See HOMER, THE ILIAD 14-23 (Robert Fitzgerald trans., 1974).
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thighs) and functional (the boy performed traditional wifely du-
ties such as housekeeping). Anthropologists have reported
finding similar institutions in other African societies. 6
But, here is what Evans-Pritchard, the celebrated anthropologist, actu-
ally wrote about the unmarried warriors among the Azande:
It was the custom for members of bachelor companies, some
of whom would always be living in barracks at court, to take
boy-wives. This was undoubtedly brought about by the scarcity
of marriageable women in the days when the nobility and also
the richer commoners kept large harems and were able to do so
because bridewealth was hard to come by and they were able to
acquire it more easily than poorer men .... [T]he only way
youths could obtain satisfaction from a woman was in adultery.
But that was a very dangerous solution to a young man's prob-
lem, for the fine his father would have to pay was heavy-
twenty spears and a woman .... So, the risk being too great, it
was the custom for cautious bachelors in the military companies
who were living at court... to marry boys and satisfy their sex-
ual needs with them. A youth of position in his company might
have more than one boy (kumba gude). To these boys their
warrior mates were badiya ngbanga 'court lovers.'
That it was on account of the difficulties of getting satisfaction
in heterosexual relationships that boy marriage was a recognized
temporary union is, I believe, shown by the fact that boy mar-
riage has in post-European times entirely disappeared ....
Azande, I think rightly, attribute the giving up of the custom to
its having become easier for youths to marry and, in the general
breakdown of morals and of the suppression of customary pun-
ishments, to indulge in adultery and fornication. Boy marriage
was owing, Azande say, to zanga ade 'lack of women.'
As one man put it, "What man would prefer a boy to a
woman? A man would be a fool to do so. The love of boys
arose from lack of women...."
The custom of boy marriage had died out before I first vis-
ited Zandeland ....
*- With regard to the sexual side, at night the boy slept with
his lover, who had intercourse with him between his thighs
(Azande expressed disgust at the suggestion of anal penetra-
tion)
86. ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 31 (internal footnotes omitted); see also E.E. Evans-
Pritchard, Sexual Inversion Among the Azande, in 72 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
1428-34 (1970) (discussing the practice of homosexuality among the Azande of the Sudan).
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... When they ceased to be boys they joined the companies
of warriors to which their at-one-time husbands belonged... so
the period of marriage was also one of apprenticeship.
The reader will realize, from a comparison of Evans-Pritchard with
what Eskridge makes of Evans-Pritchard, that Eskridge was careful to
leave out critical details. For example, Eskridge disregarded that
"Azande expressed disgust at the suggestion of anal penetration."'
Moreover, Eskridge did not inform the reader that the practice of boy-
marriage had died out completely, and that it had its origins not in any
homosexual impulse, but simply in the dearth of available female sexual
partners. Whether bemused, horrified, or supremely indifferent to the
"any port in a storm" justification of the practice offered by the Azande,
Eskridge has a duty to report accurately Evans-Prichard's position. He
did not. Nor did he report that boy-marriage was clearly a temporary ar-
rangement, and that all Azande were expected to end up in a marriage
involving a male and (several) females. 9 In contrast, an adult married
man who continued to have any sexual contact with boys was regarded as
bizarre. Evans-Pritchard reports: "I have heard of only one senior
prince-deposed by the administration-who, although he had several
wives, still habitually slept with boys. For this and other reasons he was
regarded by Azande as slightly crazy. '
Evans-Pritchard also dealt with lesbianism, and reported that whatever
examples of the practice might be found among the Azande, the reasons
were similar to those of the temporary homosexual unions among men-
simple necessity. For Evans-Pritchard, lesbianism:
[miust be regarded as a product, like male homosexuality, of
polygamy on a large scale; for if this precluded young men from
normal sex, so in large polygamous homes it prevented the
wives, or some of them, from receiving the amount of sexual at-
tention they wished for from their common husband, who,
moreover, might well have been elderly and not at the height of
his sexual vigor ....
•... It was in such polygamous families, Azande say, that
lesbianism was practiced."
Eskridge's selective rendition is insufficient in at least two respects.
87. Evans-Pritchard, supra note 86, at 1429-30 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 1430.
89. See id.
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 1431.
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First, Eskridge fails to emphasize the temporary nature of Azande same-
sex unions and the reasons for it. Second, he fails to note that the kind of
acceptable sexual contact did not include all forms of homosexual be-
havior, such as anal penetration which was regarded with disgust. 
2
These distortions are characteristic of Eskridge's method.
V. A POLYGAMOUS INTERLUDE, OU LA MAITRESSE L GITIME
Having discussed the Azande, a tribe that accepted polygamy,93 it
might be instructive to employ Eskridge's "historical" method of justify-
ing same-sex marriage on behalf of the practice of polygamy. We could
note that polygamy has been accepted in almost every primitive society
that Eskridge discusses94-the American Indian, the Igbo, the Nanda, the
Nuer, the Azande, and in a good many others as well. Polygamy also has
been widely accepted throughout human history, in China, India, the Is-
lamic world, and even among one group, the Mormons, who are part of
the Western world." Eskridge's historical argument could be far more
tellingly deployed on behalf of polygamy, which might be said "deep bi-
ology" on its side, reflecting the heterosexual male desire for sexual nov-
elty with women, an impulse far more widespread, well-recognized, and
historically sanctioned than the homosexual impulse that animates, ac-
cording to many studies, a mere 2-3% of the population.96
VI. BERDACHERIE REVISITED
Just as he resumed the story of the "female husband" and other same-
sex unions in Africa, Professor Eskridge returns to the theme of his first
paragraph on We'wha, namely, the socially sanctioned role of the man
who dresses like a woman and adopts female characteristics.97 This ber-
dache phenomenon is found mostly among some of the American Indian
tribes. According to Eskridge, the phenomenon was supposedly once
widespread before the European settlers, soldiers, and, latterly, a small
92. See id. at 1430.
93. See id. at 1429, 1431 (describing Azande society as being comprised of harems
and, alternatively, as polygamous).
94. For a complete-and witty-presentation of the case for polygamy, and a tour
d'horizon of polygamous practices around the world, see GEORGES-ANQUETIL, LA
MAtTRESSE LtGITIME (Les Editions Georges-Anquetil 1923).
95. See id.
96. EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY:
SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 297 (1994) (providing the results of a study
that indicated nearly 1.4% of women and 2.8% of the men who participated identified a
same-gender sexual pleasure).
97. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 27.
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army of anthropologists descended upon the American continent. 98
Sensing the disapproval of the powerful whites, the Indians severely lim-
ited the practice of berdacherie, in some cases ending it altogether."
Eskridge offers no evidence to support this assertion. Although plausi-
ble, it is also entirely possible that the berdache phenomenon was always
limited to a very few tribes.
Given the availability of sober disinterested studies by such anthro-
pologists as George Devereux or Callender and Kochems, why should a
reader not rely on their studies and conclusions rather than on the plau-
sible unprovabilities of Professor Eskridge? Eskridge argues that the
berdache phenomenon supports the argument for same-sex marriage,
explaining that: "most important for the present study, berdaches (like
We'wha) married individuals of the same sex, and those marriages were
recognized by Native American laws and cultures."' ° A comparison of
Eskridge's assertion with his own sources, however, reveals a different
story. Eskridge correctly refers to the work of George Devereux on the
Mohave Indians as being "[t]he first detailed academic study focusing on
Native American same-sex unions... According to Eskridge, Devereux
."reported that gender-crossing men (alyha) and women (hwame) histori-
cally had been tolerated by the Mohave and that their same-sex mar-
riages were institutionalized and socially accepted. Thus, under tribal
custom and law alyha married (and divorced) men and hwame married
(and divorced) women."'' 2 But Devereux, the pioneer student of the
berdache phenomenon, who completed his field study in an earlier pe-
riod before the berdache phenomenon might have been "cleaned up," as
Eskridge suggests, in response to aggressively inquiring anthropologists,
offered a different interpretation from that which was imposed on his
98. See id. at 17.
99. See id. at 28.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. To support this assertion, Eskridge cites George Devereux, Institutionalized
Homosexuality of the Mohave Indians, in 9 HUMAN BIOLOGY 498, 513-15 (Raymond
Pearl ed., 1937); see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 28 n.40. But Eskridge deliberately
misread, or has decided not to convey to the reader, what George Devereux offered as his
own analysis of the berdache phenonomenon. See id. at 28. Devereux treated the ber-
dache as an example, not of the acceptance of homosexuality but rather of practices that
were viewed with disdain. See Devereux, supra, at 513 (reporting that "on occasion a man
went through the habitual courtship for an alyha, because it appealed to his sense of the
preposterous"). Aside from Devereux's 1937 paper, Eskridge hardly could fail to have
noticed the extensive mention of Devereux in several of his sources, including the papers
by Callender and Kochems, by Greenwood, and by Levy.
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work in Eskridge's version.' 3 In his 1937 article, Devereux suggested
that one of the functions of the practice of institutionalized homosexual-
ity, that is, the berdache phenomenon, "was to create 'an abscess of fixa-
tion' and [to localize] the disorder in a small area of the body social."' °
This channeling of homosexuality into an "abscess of fixation," this use
of the berdache to localize "the disorder" by limiting it to "a small area
of the body social" is a plausible one, accepted by later students of simi-
lar phenomena, such as the Tahitian mahu.'5 Eskridge must have known
of Devereux's own analysis of the phenomenon, because that celebrated
anthropologist is mentioned at great length not only by Levy, but by
Evelyn Blackwood, by Callender and Kochems, and by virtually every
writer on Native American berdachehood.' 6 Nonetheless, Eskridge fails
to provide any hint of Devereux's analysis.
Furthermore, Eskridge's treatment of contemporary works concerning
the berdache is also misleading. Eskridge refers to the two leading an-
thropologists in this field, Callender and Kochems. These anthropologists
doubt the equalization of the berdache with homosexuality:
[The berdache phenomenon's] frequent equation with ho-
mosexuality ... distorts the sexual aspects of berdachehood.
Certain interests were often believed to foreshadow the as-
sumption of this status, but only one account cites homosexual
behavior. Rather than homosexuals becoming berdaches, many
berdaches, perhaps most of them, became homosexual; but
their sexual partners were always nonberdaches. Evidence for
homosexual activity unrelated to this status is abundant. North
American homosexuality transcended berdaches; though they
were its most visible and-except for their spouses-its most
consistent participants, their orientations could be bisexual or
heterosexual.07
Callender and Kochems also are skeptical about the assumptions of
Western observers of berdache sexuality, writing that:
Sexual behavior is the aspect of the berdache status in which
the reticence of informants most often combines with the prud-
ery of observers to obscure actual practice and in which suppo-
103. See generally Devereux, supra note 102.
104. See Robert I. Levy, The Community Function of Tahitian Male Transvestitism: A
Hypothesis, in 44 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 12, 19 n.10 (1971) (quoting Devereux) (altera-
tion in original).
105. See id.
106. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 224-26 (citing Levy, Blackwood, and Callender &
Kochems).
107. Callender & Kochems, supra note 32, at 444 (internal citations omitted).
1292 [Vol. 47:1271
Follow the Footnote or the Advocate
sitions have been most frequent. Early European observers,
when aware that berdaches were not intersexual, tended to as-
sume that men who dressed and acted like women were neces-
sarily homosexual .... [T]his belief, reflected in their use of the
word "berdache," was sometimes only an assumption .... [I]f
often accurate, the assumption that berdaches were homosexual
is oversimplified. Like their other attributes, sexual behavior
was variable and very complex.
Questioning whether homosexuality was an integral feature
of berdache status, [one scholar] pointed out that informants
emphasized its social aspects-transvestism and occupations-
rather than sexual behavior .... [I]t seems possible that if some
cultures considered homosexual activity a significant aspect of
this status, others did not."'
Although Eskridge argues that the earlier investigators minimized the
homosexual aspect of berdache behavior, Callender and Kochems assert
the opposite."9 It is amusing to consider that it is Eskridge who exhibits
a narrower sense of human possibilities here, though he ostensibly argues
for a broader view. Apparently, Eskridge does not comprehend that the
berdache might not always be homosexual, that human sexual behavior
is "variable and very complex."" Indeed, Eskridge hardly recognizes the
possibility that the berdache "became homosexual" through the role he
played, rather than the reverse-just as among the Nuer or the Nanda,
homosexual behavior reflected not a permanent orientation but a tempo-
rary solution, behavior abandoned as soon as heterosexual outlets be-
come possible.' Although Callender and Kochems do not deny that
many berdaches may exhibit homosexual natures, they are careful to
quote other investigators who have come to other conclusions. For ex-
ample, Callender and Kochems explained that:
[H]omosexuality is the orientation most often described or
assumed for berdaches, it is not the only one recorded or im-
plied. Kroeber suggested that some of them may have found
transvestism-including general social behavior-satisfying in
itself. Benedict held that the status included some men who
were impotent or had a weak sexual drive. Both suggestions
draw some support from the ethnographic evidence. Osgood
concluded that his information about Ingalik berdaches sug-
108. Id. at 449 (internal citations omitted).
109. See id. at 444 ("Its frequent equation with homosexuality, even by explicitly gay
writers, distorts the sexual aspects of berdachehood." (internal citation omitted)).
110. Id.at449.
111. See id. at 454-55; see also Evans-Pritchard, supra note 86, at 1429-30.
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gested asexuality. Teit's denial that Flathead berdaches were
homosexual, corroborated by Turney-High's later study, may
also have held for their Nootka counterparts. The Pima pro-
hibited homosexuality .... We conclude, then, that the berdache
category included some essentially asexual persons; perhaps cer-
tain cultures even defined this orientation as proper.
Moreover, Callender and Kochems suggest that some berdaches actu-
ally are heterosexual, a possibility that Eskridge neither entertains nor
allows the readers to consider for themselves, explaining that:
Other accounts ascribe heterosexual behavior to berdaches,
either exclusively or as part of a general bisexual orientation.
Olson described those of the Haisla as entirely heterosexual,
male berdaches marrying women and female berdaches men.
The sexual partners of one male Quinault berdache were eld-
erly women. Mcllwraith reported that some male Bella Bella
and Bella Coola berdaches married women. One male Osage
berdache had a wife. Although Navaho intersexes were re-
stricted to male sexual partners, their berdaches were essen-
tially bisexual, engaging in sexual relations with males and fe-
males.
Besides reports of open heterosexual behavior that was cul-
turally approved or at least viewed neutrally, some accounts de-
scribe berdaches as engaging in this surreptitiously. Discount-
ing a Yurok suggestion that transvestism afforded males sexual
access to women without rousing suspicion, Kroeber accepted
this as an occasional possibility. Miami berdaches may have
taken similar advantage of their status. Stevenson recorded a
parallel belief among the Zuni."3
For some readers, these extensive excerpts taken from the leading an-
thropologists of male berdaches may be wearying, but they are quoted
from so copiously in order to demonstrate that Eskridge's major assump-
tion, that berdaches are always homosexual, is not universally accepted.
In fact, there is much observation and analysis to the contrary.' Esk-
ridge writes as if the berdache phenomenon is clearly understood and de-
rived from a considerable catalogue of data."' In contrast, Callender and
Kochems cautiously describe the data as "scanty, fragmentary, and often
112. Callender & Kochems, supra note 32, at 450 (internal citations omitted) (empha-
sis added).
113. Id. (internal citations omitted).
114. See AMADIUME, supra note 50; Evans-Pritchard, supra note 86; Krige, supra note
71.
115. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 27-30.
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poor in quality... 6
Because Eskridge relies so heavily on the berdache phenomenon to
make his case,"7 one would expect him to explain just how commonly it
occurred. Instead, Eskridge allows the reader to believe that among
American Indian tribes it was a widespread phenomenon. His own
sources suggest that berdachehood was far from universal and that, while
reports of "North American Cultures Recognizing the Berdache Status"
concern 113 tribes, many of the larger tribes-the Sioux, Apache, Semi-
nole, Creek, Cherokee, and others-apparently have no reports of ber-
dachehood; that 113 tribes may seem like a lot until one remembers that
there were several thousand different Indian tribes in North America;
that the "berdache status ... seems to have been far from universal" and
was almost nonexistent to the east of the Mississippi, except in the Great
Lakes region; that even among these tribes the phenomenon was often
"rare or uncommon."'119
Again, Callender and Kochems are bracingly sober in their own review
of the scholarly literature, writing that:
[b]erdaches are usually described as rare or uncommon; num-
bers, if given, are few. Holder reported a total of six among the
Gros Ventre, five among the Teton Dakota, four for the Flat-
head, two for the Nez Perce, and one for the Shoshoni. Kroe-
ber estimated that one Yurok man in a hundred assumed this
status. Except among groups limiting the status to women, fe-
male berdaches tended to be much rarer than their male coun-
terparts. "
Even if we were to accept Eskridge's proposition that the berdache
was mostly a homosexual phenomenon, he nonetheless fails to offer a
convincing case for the acceptance of same-sex "marriage" among
American Indians. That the berdache was socially acceptable in a few
tribes is clear. That some berdaches entered into a union that may have
involved sexual relations with others of the same sex is also clear. Yet,
there is no evidence that the tribe considered this "union" to be fully le-
gitimized as the same kind of union, with the same dignity, as that be-
tween a man and woman. Since Eskridge never defines what that would
be in the American Indian context, nor how it is solemnized or otherwise
recognized, one cannot disprove what he does not even attempt to prove.
116. Callender & Kochems, supra note 33, at 443.
117. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 15,27-30,45.
118. See id. at 27-30.
119. See Callender & Kochems, supra note 32, at 444-45.
120. Id. at 443 (internal citations omitted).
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Eskridge's discussion of female berdacherie also is unpersuasive. He
relies heavily, in part, on Evelyn Blackwood's study of "cross-gender fe-
males" in the Mohave tribe.' Blackwood concluded that in these tribes,
"[s]exual behavior was part of the relationship between cross-gender fe-
males and the women they married .... [The cross-gender female's]
sexual behavior was recognized as lesbian-that is, as female homosexu-
ality."' 2 Limited in its scope and in the available evidence, the study is
mostly an analysis of its own limitations. Blackwood questions why there
is so little recorded information about female berdaches among the
Plains Indians, concluding that "[n]ineteenth century observers rarely re-
corded information on Plains Indian women, 'considering them too in-
significant to merit special treatment."" Moreover, Blackwood explains
that "[tjhe last cross-gender females seem to have disappeared among
Plains tribes by the mid-nineteenth century."'' 4 According to Black-
wood, the absence of recorded information also was attributed to societal
denial, explaining that: "The Kutenai denied the existence of cross-
gender females among them .... The Arapaho told Alfred Kroeber
that the Lakota had female berdache, but there is no corroborating evi-
dence from the Lakota themselves. Informants were clearly reticent or
unwilling to discuss cross-gender women."'
Apparently, Blackwood did not consider an alternate explanation, that
is, that the phenomenon really was not so widespread, and perhaps the
Lakota did not offer corroborating evidence because there was none to
offer. How does Blackwood explain the paucity of evidence? According
to her, the phenomenon must have diminished, if not died out, because
of the "dominant ideology of Western culture,"' maintaining that:
The record of Plains cross-gender females remains limited..
By the late nineteenth century the female cross-gender role
had all but disappeared among Native Americans. Its final de-
mise was related to a change in the construction of sexuality
and gender in these tribes. The dominant ideology of Western
culture, with its belief in the inferior nature of the female role
and its insistence on heterosexuality, began to replace tradi-
tional Native American gender systems.
Ideological pressures of white culture encouraged Native
121. See Evelyn Blackwood, Sexuality and Gender in Certain Native American Tribes:
The Case of Cross-Gender Females, in 10 SIGNS 27, 35 (1984).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 38.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 38-39 (footnotes omitted).
126. Id. at 39.
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American peoples to reject the validity of the cross-gender role
and to invoke notions of "proper" sexuality that supported
127
men's possession of sexual rights to women.
Blackwood continually attributes the lack of evidence for what she
wishes to show not to the paucity of such evidence, but rather to misre-
porting, or to underreporting, or to overlooking, by Western anthropolo-
gists, of the phenomenon, or to the embarrassed silence of Indian infor-
mants, or to changes wrought by contact with Christian sexual morality.'2
Although Blackwood's explanation may be accurate, it also could be in-
correct; Blackwood's principal shortcoming is her insistence, without
hard evidence, of widespread institutionalized homosexuality among the
American Indians.
12 9
Eskridge is unconcerned about the lack of such evidence. For him, the
berdache phenomenon is a given for both sexes:
Although they have received less academic attention, female
berdaches represented an important cultural institution in most
Native American communities. Like her male counterpart, the
female berdache assumed many of the responsibilities tradition-
ally performed by the opposite sex, including hunting and
heading a household. And she would commonly marry another
woman. 130
Not one of Eskridge's sources supports the assertion that "female ber-
daches represented an important cultural institution in most Native
American communities.0 3' Nor is there evidence that the female ber-
dache "would commonly marry another woman.0 32 In fact, Blackwood
has attempted to make the best possible case for the existence of the fe-
male berdache. Her article appeared in Signs: Journal of Women in
Culture and Society, which is not a journal of anthropology. Blackwood
falls to show that the female berdache was "an important cultural institu-
tion in most Native American communities. 1 33 She limits her study to
the female cross-gender role "as it existed historically in several Native
American tribes, primarily in western North America and the Plains. It
focuses on western tribes that shared a basically egalitarian mode of pro-
duction in precolonial times, and for which sufficient data on the female
127. Id. at 39-40.
12& See id. at 36-39.
129. See id. at 28-29, 35.
130. ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 29.
131. Id.
132 Id.
133. Id.
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role exist."'134 Far from being a widespread phenomenon, there are only
five tribes out of several hundred in which Blackwood found certain evi-
dence for the existence of the female berdache.'3' These are the Kaska,
the Klamath, the Mohave, the Maricopa, and the Cocopa.'36 Among the
Plains Indians, Blackwood found them "noteworthy for the relative ab-
sence of the female cross-gender role."'37 In other words, she has found
evidence for the female berdache in fewer than one percent of the Native
American tribes. Inexplicably, Eskridge concludes from Blackwood's
study that most Native American communities had female berdaches,
and describes this as "an important cultural institution."'38 That conclu-
sion is without foundation.
Again, Eskridge offers no evidence for the existence of same-sex mar-
riages within the context of the berdache phenomenon. It is illegitimate
to make a case for same-sex marriage by an appeal to history that never
distinguishes between a "union" and a "marriage," a distinction which
would involve further research into Indian mores. Every assumption
made by Eskridge-the magnitude of the berdache phenomenon, the
supposed necessary connection of the berdache and homosexuality, and
the existence of sanctioned marriages that would be recognized by the
tribe as equivalent to heterosexual marriages, is undercut by his own
sources.'39 Moreover, Eskridge refuses to entertain the idea that the ber-
dache phenomenon may represent another human possibility, namely a
defined social role for the effeminate or the transvestite, not by way of
social approval, but as Devereux suggested, by channeling the impulse,
isolating it, and holding it as an admonition to the larger society of het-
erosexuals.' 4°
In the importance he gives to the berdache, Eskridge participates in a
recent effort to reduce or even efface sexual categories, sex and gender
alike being seen merely a matter of "social construction." Under this ar-
gument, these categories are fluid in their boundaries, reflecting not im-
moveable natural distinctions but culturally inflicted ones. Books by
John Boswell and Eskridge provide examples of what might be called the
argument for situational sexuality. Whatever the argument is dubbed, it
is Eskridge's failure to accurately portray his own cited sources that is
134. Blackwood, supra note 121, at 28 (footnote omitted).
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 29.
139. See id. at 224.
140. See id. at 28-30; see also Devereux, supra note 102.
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most troubling to the critical reader. Moreover, Eskridge does not pro-
vide evidence for his conclusion that "berdaches (like We'wha) married
individuals of the same sex, and those marriages were recognized by Na-
tive American laws and cultures. 141  Ultimately, it is not true that
"[m]arriages between men and male berdaches were widespread among
Native American cultures., 142 Likewise, it is not true that "[a]s a general
matter, same-sex marriages tended to conform to traditional Native
American marriage patterns . . . [and that] [f]emale berdaches and
woman-woman marriages were integral to women's ability to achieve a
higher status in most Native American cultures." '43
VII. MULTICULTURALISM, OR THE PERSISTENCE OF ROUSSEAU
If his use of sources on African "female husbands" and Native Ameri-
can berdaches are both troublesome, Eskridge also reflects one of the
worst penchants of modern "multiculturalism." To Eskridge, the world's
major civilizations seem minor, and vice-versa. He hopes that the West-
ern civilization will learn from its primitive betters:
According to an authoritative survey of sexual practices
around the world in 1951: In 49 (64 percent) of the 76 societies
other than our own for which information is available, homo-
sexual activities of one sort or another are considered normal
and socially acceptable for certain members of the community.
... In many cases this [same-sex] behavior occurs within the
framework of courtship and marriage, the man who takes the
part of the female being recognized as a berdache and treated as
a woman. In other words, a genuine mateship is involved. An-
thropological fieldwork since 1951 has not only confirmed but
deeply elaborated on this observation. Particular attention has
been paid to the mugawe of the Kenyan Meru, the Siberian
Chuckchee, Tahitian mahus, and the Indian hijras. With the
exception of the hijras, the unions of these berdaches to people
of the same sex have been treated by their indigenous cultures
as culturally and legally recognized marriages.'"
The following outlines the Eskridgean method. The first step is the
appeal to statistics: "In 49 (64 percent) of the 76 societies other than our
own for which information is available, homosexual activities.., are con-
sidered normal and socially acceptable for certain members of the com-
141. ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 28.
142. Id. at 29.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 29-30 (footnotes omitted).
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munity., 14' And what are these forty-nine societies? To wit: Aranda,
Aymara, Azande, Chamorro, Chuckchee, Creek, Crow, Dahomeans,
Easter Islanders, Hidatsa, Hopi, Ila, Keraki, Kiwai, Koniag, Koryak,
Lango, Mandan, Maricopa, Menomini, Nama, Naskapi, Natchez, Na-
vaho, Omaha, Oto, Palauans, Papago, Ponca, Pukapukans, Quinault,
Reddi, Samoans, Seminole, Siwans, Tanala, Thonga, Tinguian, Tswana
(females only), Tubatulabal, Tupinamba, Witoto, Wogeo, Wolof, Yakut,
Yuma, Yungar, Yurok, Zuni. 46
These are the societies "other than our own" to which Eskridge al-
ludes, but does not list, possibly hoping the reader will not inquire too
closely. However, even in these societies, homosexual activities are
"normal and socially acceptable" not for all, but "for certain members"
of the community.147 And in these forty-nine societies, the authors of the
study never argue that homosexuals are bound in "culturally and legally
recognized marriages. '
Most telling is that a list of essentially primitive tribes, demurely de-
scribed as societies "other than our own," is offered as if those tribes'
practices are worthy of emulation. Eskridge's article expresses the com-
plete collapse of self-confidence on the part of the Western world, or at
least, of an influential stratum of that world.
It should be pointed out that a great many of the primitive societies
deemed by Eskridge to be tolerant of homosexuality (and hence, by ex-
tension, part of an argument for same-sex marriage), and therefore wor-
thy of emulation by our benighted civilization, have also been known to
engage in other practices, such as cannibalism, female genital mutilation
(infibulation), massacre or enslavement of enemies taken in war, and
other practices which it was once held to be the duty of the civilized to
extirpate. The slave trade in Africa was stamped out by the British even
though today it continues among some of the tribes of the Arabian pen-
insula. Given that homosexual behavior is observed in less than five per-
cent of the population, why is that more "normal" than, say, slavery?
Perhaps it is our society, the society of the civilized, that has something to
teach the Siwans, the Lango, the Chuckchee, and the Naskapi.
Most of those forty-nine societies probably number only a few hundred
members. Yet Eskridge mentions by name only four societies,1 49 being
145. Id at 29 (citation omitted).
146. See CLELLAN S. FORD & FRANK A. BEACH, PATTERNS OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
130 n.2 (1951).
147. ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 29.
148. Id. at 30.
149. See id. at 29.
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four where not only is homosexuality to some extent accepted, but where
he believes unions between homosexuals "have been treated by their in-
digenous cultures as culturally and legally recognized marriages. '' 50
These are: 1) the Kenyan Meru, 2) the Siberian Chuckchee, 3) the Tahi-
tian mahus, and 4) the Indian hirjas."'
VIII. TALES OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC
Eskridge's treatment of the Tahitian mahu is revealing. In a previously
published article, Eskridge described Robert I. Levy, the author of nu-
merous studies of Polynesian culture, as "[t]he best source for the mahu
tradition."'52 Levy's study of the mahu, entitled The Community Func-
tion of Tahitian Male Transvestitism: A Hypothesis,'53 was based on a stay
in Tahiti. But Levy's study comes to conclusions that are quite different
from those Eskridge transmitted:
Someone would say, "I don't know who the mahu is in X
village." When asked, "Then how do you know there is one?"
the answer would be something like, "There always is one," or
"That's the way things are." When asked if there were ever two
mahus in a village, the common answer was, "No, only one."
One informant pressed on this said, "When one dies, another
replaces him. God arranges it like that. It isn't the nature of
things, two mahus in one place. Only one ... and when that
one dies, he is replaced."
If there is only one mahu in each village, and there are never two to-
gether, it is improbable that Tahitian culture "culturally and legally rec-
ognized" the marriage of two mahus.'55 Furthermore, some mahus are
"recruited for the role."'56 In other words, this is not simply a channeling
of homosexuals into a culturally recognized role, but the fulfilling of a
social role that may determine the sexual behavior of the incumbent.
Levy recounts that he had:
[s]een in other Tahitian communities very young boys appar-
ently being coaxed into the role where I had the impression that
the clues, if any, to which the coaxers were responding were at
most related to the possibility of the child playing a transvestite
150. Id. at 30.
151. See id.
152. ESKRIDGE, supra note 18, at 1463 n.159.
153. See Levy, supra note 104, at 13 (noting that Levy spent twenty-six months study-
ing the Tahitian-speaking communities in French Polynesia).
154. Id. at 14.
155. ESKRIDGE, supra 9, at 30.
156. See Levy, supra note 104, at 17.
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role and not to any strong inclination .... [F]or most people
the essence of the mahu was his highly visible "doing woman's
work" in its public aspects; the private and generally secret sex-
ual acts were considered by some as a perverse aspect of this
otherwise acceptable behavior.157
According to Levy, Tahitian society shows an:
absence of strong internal shaping towards the self definition of
manhood in its sense of contrast and complementarity to wom-
anhood [and] that [consequently] there have been developed
various external marks or signs which function to clarify that
definition ....
I believe that the mahu role, with its clear cut rules, its high
visibility, its strictly limited incumbency, and its pre-empting of
homosexual behavior, also has a message function. It says
"there, clearly, out in the open, is the mahu, the one man who
has taken a female role. I am a non-mahu. Whatever feelings I
have about men are no threat to me and to my eventual role as
family head. I can see exactly what he is, and I am clear about
myself in that I am not he."
I suggest that the mahu is a carefully maintained role, build-
ing on pre-existing possibilities for a supply of candidates, which
carefully presents a behavior complex that serves the important
function, among other subsidiary ones, sidelining and stabilizing
a precarious aspect of identity by a clear negative image-that
which I am not, and cannot be.
Far from representing the acceptance by Tahitian society of homosex-
ual marriages, the mahu serves as a marker of behavior that is not cultur-
ally or legally sanctioned, the carefully selected embodiment of the male
who is non-male.'59 He possesses the qualities that are to be avoided by
men and is in no sense an example of the approval of homosexuality, and
still less of same-sex marriage."' Although Eskridge describes Levy's ar-
ticle as the latest and fullest treatment of the Tahitian mahu, it is difficult
to believe that he read it thoroughly. If he had, he would not have de-
scribed their putative unions as marriage "to people of the same sex."''
While there is some furtive and transgressive sex between ordinary males
and the mahu, there is no evidence of a marriage-like union as "hav[ing]
been treated by their indigenous cultures as culturally and legally recog-
157. Id.
158. Id. at 18-19.
159. See id. at 17.
160. See id.
161. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 30.
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nized marriages. '
IX. WARRIOR LOVE
Eskridge's writing suffers from a hypertrophied sense of the omnipres-
ence and indispensability of sex. For him, the bonds between warriors in
ancient Greece, or Tokugawa Japan, necessarily have a homosexual as-
pect.163 He writes of the samurai:
The samurai warriors of feudal and Tokugawa Japan went to
battle accompanied by apprentice warrior-lovers. Literary
sources, such as The Great Mirror of Male Love by Ihara Sai-
kaku, depict these relationships as highly choreographed and
romantic, with strong loyalty on each side. The beginning of a
relationship between an apprentice (wakashu) and a samurai
involved a formal exchange of written and spoken vows, giving
the relationship a marriage-like status. Each participant prom-
ised to love the other in this life and the next-one step beyond
our "till death do us part." As in marriage, sex was only one
element of the samurai relationship. The samurai was supposed
to provide social backing, emotional support, and a model of
manliness for the apprentice. In exchange, the latter was ex-
pected to be worthy of his lover by being a good student of
samurai manhood.'
When a writer inserts the phrase "such as" before the only work he
cites, thus implying that there is a wealth of other similar evidence he
could supply, readers should be wary. Eskridge refers to sources, "such
as the Great Mirror of Male Love," without ever referring to any other
literary source about the samurai culture. He hedges a bit, noting that
"sex was only one element of the samurai relationship,' '65 but the actual
nature of the relationship is not as certain as he implies.66 The "formal
exchange of written and spoken vows" is an attribute that would apply
equally to many situations."' For example, consider the vows of vassal
and lord in feudalism, or the mutual promises of master and appren-
tice."' Although these examples involve mutual affirmation of a human
relationship, neither rises to the level of a "marriage-like status." Esk-
162. Id.
163. See id. at 30-31 (noting that "[a]s in marriage, sex was only one element of the
samurai relationship").
164. Id. (footnotes omitted).
165. Id.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 30.
168. See id.
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ridge adopts some of the text, almost verbatim, from the introduction by
Paul Gordon Schalow to his translation of The Great Mirror of Male
Love;69 from Eskridge's presentation, however, the evidence of a sexual
component in the relationship of a samurai to his apprentice warrior is
far from certain. Even a "marriage-like status" is not a marriage, any
more than a "death-like trance" is the same thing as death. The phrase
insidiously stakes a claim even as it allows for a face-saving denial: we are
still not certain as to whether the samurai does or does not enter into a
recognized marriage.
X. THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST
To some extent, Eskridge is reckless in dealing with cultures remote
from those of the West. In analyzing cultures in Africa, among the
American Indians, in Tahiti, and in medieval Japan, Eskridge should be
more cautious in drawing comparisons with the West. But his treatment
of the ancient Near East, the precursor to ancient Israel, and hence to
the West itself, does not inspire greater confidence. Discussing the
Mesopotamian statutes, Eskridge writes that:
none of Mesopotamia's early legal codes-the laws of
Urukagina (2375 B.C.), the Laws of Ur-Nammu (2100 B.C.),
the Laws of Eshnunna (1750 B.C.), the Laws of Hammurabi
(1726 B.C.), and the Hittite Laws (around 800 B.C.)-prohib-
ited or disapproved of same-sex relationships, even though sex
and marriage were otherwise heavily regulated. 7
Yet prohibition or disapproval of same-sex marriage simply may have
been unnecessary. To support his proposition, Eskridge relies upon Law
Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor,171 which contains many
other examples of Near Eastern legal codes that do explicitly prohibit
homosexual activities. Yet, Eskridge carefully named only those which
are silent on the matter." He also notes that the Hittite laws contain a
provision that, he says, according to one translation may allow for a slave
to buy a "free youth" as his "spouse." ' Neither of Eskridge's sources on
the Hittite laws-not the 1951 compilation by Neufeld, nor the larger
1995 compilation by Martha Roth which contains the Hittite laws-ac-
169. See Paul Gordon Schalow, Introduction, in IHARA SAIKAKU, THE GREAT
MIRROR OF MALE LOVE, (Paul Gordon Schalow Trans., 1990).
170. ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 20.
171. MARTHA T. ROTH, LAW COLLECTIONS FROM MESOPOTAMIA AND ASIA
MINOR (1995).
172. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 20 n.9.
173. Id. at 20.
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cept this extraordinary translation."' Roth, agreeing essentially with
Neufeld, translates the same provision differently: "If a slave pays a
brideprice for a free young man and acquires him as a son-in-law, no one
shall free him from slavery.""' 5 The critical difference is that between a
"spouse" and a "son-in-law." On what basis does Eskridge challenge the
translation offered by two specialist scholars of ancient legal codes?
Whose translation did Eskridge adopt? None other than John Boswell
who, according to Eskridge, "disputes the reading preferred by Neu-
feld.""' 6 Neufeld wrote this: "If a slave gives the bride-price to a free
youth and takes him to dwell in his household as husband (of his daugh-
ter), no-one shall surrender him." "' Eskridge's comment on Neufeld's
version is telling: "The bracketed portion is an interpolation by Neufeld,
who admits as much. Neufeld also reports that earlier scholars had in-
terpreted [the provision] as a state sanction for 'homosexual' relations
among slaves and that 'such a relationship among free men did not re-
quire any special legal provisions.""' 8 Actually, Neufeld's interpolation
174. See E. NEUFELD, THE HITTITE LAWS 10-11 (1951) (translating Section 36 of the
Hittite laws as mandating that "[i]f a slave gives the brideprice to a free youth and takes
him to dwell in his household as husband (of his daughter), no-one shall surrender him")
(footnote omitted, emphasis added); see also ROTH, supra note 171, at 160 (translating a
passage of Middle Assyrian Law which provides that "[i]f a man sodomizes his comrade
and they . . . find him guilty, they shall sodomize him and they shall turn him into a
eunuch"). (footnote omitted).
175. ROTH, supra note 171, at 222.
176. ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 20 n.11.
177. See NEUFELD, supra note 174, at 10-11 (providing the English translation of Sec-
tion 36 of the Hittite Law); see also ROTH, supra note 171, at 222 (same).
178. ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 20 n.11 (citations omitted); see also NEUFELD, supra
note 174, at 151 (noting that many different "interpretations have been propounded on the
actual meaning and legal implications of § 36"). It is instructive to compare the sobriety
and scrupulosity of Ephraim Neufeld's comment on Section 36 with the manner in which
Eskridge uses Boswell to blandly dismiss Neufeld. Neufeld notes that
[Aiccording to Friedrich and Zimmern, Witzel, Goetze, Struve and Korosec-the
idea of paederasty is incorporated here; it would seem that such a relationship
among free men did not require any special legal provisions. This interpretation
was never regarded as certain. On the other hand the interpretation suggested
by Hrozny and followed by Walther and Sturtevant, implies that the free youth is
taken as a husband by the slave for his daughter. Bechtel suggests the following
rendering: "If a slave provides the bride-price for a free son (i.e. the slave's son)
and (the girl) takes him as her husband, no one releases her (from the contract)."
Bechtel explains his suggested translation-which sounds rather strange-with a
comment. He says "perhaps the girl's parents tried to annul the marriage on the
ground that the young man was the son of the slave. The difficulty is that the
girl's father would have to accept the bride-price and the bridegroom, and it
would be too violent a treatment of the text to understand that he is the subject
of epzi."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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was hardly unique because there are many lacunae in the remaining
texts; Neufeld merely offers suggestions as to the missing words. He
does not deliberately make an unwarranted interpolation. Further, Neu-
feld himself acknowledged the possibility, though remote, that the provi-
sion sanctioned homosexual marriage.179 Taken as a whole, however, the
scholarly tradition overwhelmingly supports the addition of the phrase
"of his daughter" after the word "spouse" as the proper interpolation of
the provision.' Roth rejected Boswell's effort, realizing that it was actu-
ally he, not Neufeld, who was guilty of what Eskridge calls a "strained
effort by a modem historian to read his own prejudices into another cul-
ture's text."''
XI. EMPERORS AND CATAMITES IN CATHAY
There is one civilization that rivals the Christian West in its size, co-
herence, and achievements: China. Professor Eskridge's account of the
vast and venerable Chinese civilization consumes less space, only two
paragraphs, than that devoted to the berdache of a few North American
Indian tribes or to the "female husband" of certain tribes in West Af-
rica."' Eskridge explains that "[m]arriage-like same-sex unions have
been documented in China during the Yuan and Ming dynasties."' 3 The
main source for his assertion is Bret Hinsch's Passions of the Cut
Sleeve."' Out of four footnotes devoted to the discussion of Chinese cul-
ture, three cite to Bret Hinsch's book.' Several questions need to be
asked. Why is Hinsch's book, written by a homosexual activist, preferred
179. See NEUFELD, supra note 174, at 151.
180. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 20 n.11.
181. Id. The full sentence shows how Eskridge hides behind Boswell here, quoting-
and failing to take issue with-him thus: "Boswell rejects Neufeld's speculations as a
strained effort by a modem historian to read his own prejudices into another culture's
text." Id. (internal citation omitted).
182. See id. at 31-32.
183. Id. at 31.
184. See BRET HINSCH, PASSIONS OF THE CUT SLEEVE: THE MALE HOMOSEXUAL
TRADITION IN CHINA 176-77 (1990) (explaining that woman/woman unions were akin to
marriage in that both involved a ceremonial initiation and included a division of labor
within the family); see also WOLFRAM EBERHARD; GUILT AND SIN IN TRADITIONAL
CHINA (1967); R.H. VAN GULIK, SEXUAL LIFE IN ANCIENT CHINA (1961); JONATHAN
D. SPENCE, THE MEMORY PALACE OF MATrEO RICCI (1984); James P. McGough, Devi-
ant Marriage Patterns in Chinese Society, in NORMAL AND ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR IN
CHINESE CULTURE (Arthur Kleinman and Tsung-Yi Lin eds., 1981); Vivien W. Ng, Ho-
mosexuality and the State in Late Imperial China, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY:
RECLAIMING THE GAY AND LESBIAN PAST 76 (Martin Bauml Duberman et al. eds.,
1989).
185. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 225 nn.50, 51, 53.
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to the scholarly studies of the Dutch Sinologist van Gulik, or the more
recent Wolfram Eberhard?"" Why does Eskridge not rely on the views
of leading Chinese Sinologists, who are only an e-mail away? '
Already we are made wary by such phrases as "marriage-like ... un-
ions" because these merely describe non-sanctified couplings that are
"marriage-like" only because the participants chose to call their relation-
ship a marriage. A careful reading of Hinsch's book turns up no evi-
dence for the conclusion that Chinese civilization actually recognized
same-sex "marriages." Instead, the reader is presented only with the
usual examples of libidinous license that typically was permitted to this
or that emperor.' s The flimsiness of the evidence is transparent, for Esk-
ridge immediately alludes, not to history, but to fiction, to the "stories of
Li Yu":
Many of his stories speak openly and approvingly of com-
panionate love affairs between men, a practice particularly as-
sociated with Fujian and other provinces in southern China. In
at least one story Li Yu relates the tragic romance of two men
(Jifang and Ruiji) who become "husband and wife." In de-
scribing the couple's wedding, Li Yu goes out of his way to em-
phasize that the couple adhered to the formal requisites of mar-
riage (bride-price, the various wedding rituals), giving some
indication that similar same-sex marriages were common in
southern China and perhaps elsewhere in the region. It has
been inferred from Li Yu's work and other evidence that there
were "institutionalized relationships between males in some ar-
eas, and that these relationships were often expressed in terms
of marriage and carried out in [the same] social forms con-
nected with 'regular' marriage."1"9
Upon a closer examination of the underlying source material, it ap-
pears that the story of Li Yu is a fantastic tale, a kind of science-fiction,
that centers on the union of Jifang with a fourteen-year-old boy, Ruiji.'"
According to the story, the two apparently "marry," that is, Jifang paid a
186. See id. at 31 n.50 (citing Hinsch to support the proposition that "[m]arriage-like
same-sex unions have been documented in China during the Yuan and Ming dynasties");
id. at 32 n.53 (citing Hinsch to support the proposition that some "scholars believe sister-
hood relationships [between Chinese women] shared many attributes of marriage").
187. Suimin Pan, professor and director of the Institute for Research in Sexuality and
Gender at the Renmin University of China, one of the leading Chinese sexologists, was
contacted by e-mail and responded to our inquiries within 24 hours. Eskridge relies al-
most entirely on a single work, a slender, tendentious monograph by Brad Hinsch.
188. See HINSCH, supra note 184, at 34-54.
189. ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 31-32.
190. See HINSCH, supra note 184, at 121-36.
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bride-price to the father of Ruiji.'9' Although the word "marriage" is
used, there is no mention or suggestion that this "marriage" was recog-
nized by society. '92 Yet a cloud remains over this otherwise happy mar-
riage, because both men know that the day of separation will arrive when
Ruiji inevitably leaves to marry a woman. 93 At most, the tale implies
that the coupling of Ruiji and Jifang is both temporary, and not a part of
recognized marriage; 4 for if it were, the narrator would not so blandly
describe the concern that the younger one inevitably would have to leave
to marry a woman.'95 If it were a recognized marriage, no leave-taking
would be necessary, for even a polygamous Zinjang could keep his boy-
bride and take a female bride as well. But it is clear that Ruiji will have
to leave Jifang because he is not in a recognized marriage.'96
According to the story, Li Yu engages in a fantasy:
In gratitude for all of the love and devotion showered on him
by his lover, Ruiji castrates himself so that he can avoid hetero-
sexual marriage and remain with Jifang forever. Remarkably,
the scar heals into the shape of a vagina. From this time for-
ward Ruiji binds his feet, dresses as a woman, and remains in-
doors like a virtuous wife.' 97
This story is hardly persuasive evidence of "male marriage." Accord-
ing to Hinsch, "Li Yu portrays male marriage in idealistic terms....
Nevertheless, the bizarre circumstances surrounding Ruiji's castration
suggest that the particulars of gender transformation in this case owe
more to Li Yu's fertile imagination than to social reality."'98 This quota-
tion happens to be taken from the very page in Hinsch's book that is spe-
cifically cited by Eskridge.'99 Because the story is merely a homosexual
fantasy, it is worthless in terms of its historical evidentiary value. None-
theless, Hinsch persists in trying to extract from this tale something about
"same-sex marriage":
Even more important within the story [more important than
what, one wishes to ask] are references to an actual marriage
ceremony. This ritual'was not simply the product of Li Yu's
wild imaginings: men apparently found it desirable to construct
191. See id. at 126.
192. See id.
193. HINSCH, supra note 184, at 128.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 129.
197. Id. at 128.
198. Id. at 129.
199. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 31.
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homosexual relationships along the lines of heterosexual mar-
riage. The greatest advantage to be gained was the legitimation
of the union according to a recognized convention.w
This homosexual man "apparently found it desirable" to mimic hetero-
sexual marriage."' What does this mean? If it does not mean that there
was an actual ceremony of the kind that would make a same-sex mar-
riage acquire a formal status equivalent to the accepted heterosexual va-
riety, then it means nothing, as part of an argument based on the "history
of same-sex marriage."
Eskridge claims that "Li Yu goes out of his way to emphasize that the
couple adhered to the formal requisites of marriage (bride-price, the
various wedding rituals), giving some indication that similar same-sex
marriages were common in southern China and perhaps elsewhere in the
region. '' ' Given the absence of any citations to support this last asser-
tion, Eskridge is apparently speculating. A reader should ask why a fan-
tasy-fiction detailing a fictional couple's adherence to "formal requisites
of marriage" offers evidence that real "same-sex marriages" were ever
performed. Inexplicably, Eskridge posits that this fiction gives "some in-
dication" that same-sex marriages "were common in southern China"
and "perhaps elsewhere in the region."23 The use of the term "perhaps"
does not make the phrase any less outrageous. Once all scholarly stan-
dards have been jettisoned, the reader-unless endowed with terrific
mental stamina-may find it difficult to disagree or question each mis-
statement. Rather, the reader is likely to accept each exaggeration, falsi-
fication, or illogical leap, simply because to do otherwise is too exhaust-
ing.
Even more disturbing is Eskridge's claim that "[ilt has been inferred
from Li Yu's work and other evidence that there were 'institutionalized
relationships between males in some areas, and that these relationships
were often expressed in terms of marriage and carried out in [the same]
social forms connected with 'regular' marriage.' 204 To support his claim,
Eskridge cites several sources, attributing the other evidence to the
works of Hinsch and Jonathan Spence.205 Jonathan Spence is recognized
as a serious scholar; the cited source, The Memory Palace of Matteo
200. HINSCH, supra note 184, at 129.
201. See id.
202. ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 31.
203. Id.
204. See id at 31-32.
205. See id. at 31 n.50, 32 n.51.
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Ricci,2°6 is not a work of special pleading. But in his study, Spence merely
notes the prevalence of homosexuality in the Ming dynasty, reporting
that the Ming scholar Shen Defu wrote that "in Fujian province homo-
sexual males often lived together conventionally in households, the elder
partner being treated by the younger one's parents as their son-in-law
and supported with the money they had laid aside for his marriage por-
tion."2 °7 This is the closest Spence comes to presenting any evidence that
would sustain Eskridge's claim. When Eskridge writes that "these (ho-
mosexual) relationships were often expressed in terms of marriage," he
can only be referring to this passage from "Shen Defu." ' The "terms of
marriage," then, are not an official ceremony, nor some general recogni-
tion by society of something that can be called "marriage." Rather, the
"terms of marriage" refer to the fact that homosexual couples could live
together conventionally, and that the parents of the younger partner
could treat the older partner as a son-in-law, who might then receive the
sums set aside as the younger's marriage portion.
At best, Spence's study suggests, apropos of homosexuality, first that it
existed, and second, that it attracted the alarmed attention of such resi-
dent Jesuits as Matteo Ricci. 2°9 Ricci was quick to denounce the homo-
sexuality, noting that: "In China there are those who reject normal sex
and indulge in depravity, they abandon sex with women and instead they
corrupt young males. This kind of filthiness is not even discussed by wise
men in the West, for fear of defiling their own mouths.""2 ' Surely the
sensible question is this: if there had been the slightest evidence of any
societal acceptance in China of same-sex marriage, would Ricci not have
denounced it in even stronger terms? Yet there is no evidence that he,
or any other scandalized Jesuit commenting on the fact of homosexuality,
ever hinted at the possibility that the Chinese tolerated same-sex mar-
riage.2 ' Given the desire of the Jesuits to expose what they saw as the
most "decadent" features of Chinese society (which, of course, could
only be saved by the widespread adoption of the Christian creed they
were attempting to spread), if there had been such evidence of socially
accepted same-sex marriages, Ricci would surely have noted it.
Serious scholars of Chinese civilization, even connoisseurs of its varie-
ties of sin, have never found any acceptance of same-sex marriage by
206. SPENCE, supra note 184.
207. Id. at 227.
208. ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 31.
209. See SPENCE, supra note 184, at 226-31.
210. Id. at 229.
211. See id. at 226-31.
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China. So distant and different in so many ways from the West, Chinese
civilization shares with the West a refusal to contemplate such a practice.
In fact, homosexual activity itself is condemned in the ancient Chinese
religious texts. Wolfgang Eberhard, a scholar overlooked by Eskridge,
notes that the Cheng-fa, the oldest of the religious (Buddhist) texts, un-
hesitatingly regards homosexuality as a sin, and that more modem texts,
Li Yu and Tung-ming, mention homosexuality briefly but continue to
condemn it." According to Eberhard, in general, "[i]t is clear.., that
the modem Chinese feel strongly that ... especially sexual acts are un-
clean and should be hidden, a trait which began to appear already in the
tenth century text." '
Throughout Eskridge's brief discussion on China is an unstated prem-
ise of a different kind: that China is far more relaxed and tolerant than
the West. But Eberhard, whose Guilt and Sin in Traditional China is the
most recent scholarly study of the matter, believes many in the West
have allowed themselves to overlook the Chinese reality, which is far
more repressive than that of the West. 14 Eberhard criticizes Westerners
who look to China for lessons for their own societies, writing that:
This [condemnatory] aspect should be stressed especially be-
cause many books on China try to give the impression that sex
is something "quite natural" and unproblematic among the
Chinese, as long as it is "normal" and occurs among persons
who are not forbidden by law or taboo to have sexual rela-
tions."5
Given China's importance, it is strange that Eskridge gives no evidence
of having contacted any Chinese sexologists. In contrast, the authors of
this article did contact, by e-mail, one of China's leading sexologists, Pro-
fessor Suimin Pan."6 Undoubtedly, Professor Suimin Pan's summary of
the Chinese view of same-sex marriage is more authoritative than that of
Bret Hinsch, or any of the handful of other authorities relied upon by
Professor Eskridge.
Professor Suimin Pan agrees that there had been some toleration of
homosexual behavior in China."7 According to his account of the Chi-
nese view of same-sex marriage, "[T]he same-sex marriage had been
212. EBERHARD, supra note 184, at 64.
213. Id.
214. See id. at 64-65.
215. Id
216. E-mail from Suimin Pan, Professor and Director of the Institute for Research in
Sexuality and Gender at the Renmin University of China, to Peter Lubin (Jul. 29, 1997)
(on file with author).
217. See id.
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never allowed by any Chinese person (not only the people, but also the
persons) in the history. Chinese culture considered children-birth as the
first goal of any marriage. This was the so-called 'Chinese religion':
(worship of ancestry). 218
What is most objectionable about Eskridge's work is his refusal to
weigh the sources. In dealing with China, as with other societies, the
works of the engaged and the tendentious are deliberately relied on, and
many of the sources that might have been consulted directly-such as the
books of van Gulik or Eberhard or Professor Pan-are willfully ignored.
These are among the silences in Eskridge's text, the grand omissions that
continually give pause and should trouble those for whom history mat-
ters.
XII. THE ROMAN EMPIRE AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
With regard to classical antiquity, the reader might expect Eskridge, as
he approaches the foundations of Western civilization, to be as scrupu-
lous as he can with his sources. After all, most readers likely will not
question his writing about the Nanda, the Nuer, or the Hittites. But
quite a number of his likely readers will have some acquaintance with
Roman history and literature. Yet here, too, Eskridge offers an aston-
ishing series of misreadings. First, he assures the reader "how common
same-sex unions and even marriages have been in other times and other
cultures.""2 9 Eskridge insists that "same-sex marriages are a common-
place in human history" and attempts to "put to rest the argument that
same-sex marriage is somehow so unnatural or dysfunctional as to be
unheard of.''22° Among these, Eskridge argues that same-sex unions have
"at least been tolerated" in pre-modern Western cultures, such as the
211Roman Empire, both pagan and Christian.
In this endeavor, he is largely retailing for a legal audience arguments
made by the Yale historian John Boswell in his books Christianity, Social
Tolerance, and Homosexuality and Same-Sex Unions in Premodern
Europe. Oddly, in a footnote Eskridge agrees that in the latter book,
"Boswell overreads or misreads some or many of his sources .... It is a
charge that has been repeatedly and persuasively made against Boswell's
earlier work. ' One example of this tendentious reading, which Esk-
218. Id.
219. ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 16.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 27 n.37.
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ridge wisely omits, is Boswell's citation of the classical Roman law defini-
tion of marriage as "a partnership for life. ' The problem is that the
definition of the classical jurist Modestinus specified that marriage was
"the union of male and female and a partnership for life." 24 Boswell's
omissions are crucial to his subject: same-sex unions. The classical defi-
nition of marriage indicated that they were different-sex unions. Nor was
Modestinus an anomaly. The writings of his teacher, Ulpian, in the very
first provision in the Digest, state that:
Jus naturale is that which nature has taught to all animals; for
it is not a law specific to mankind but it is common to all ani-
mals-land animals, sea animals, and the birds as well. Out of
this comes the union of man and woman which we call mar-
riage, and the procreation of children, and their rearing.25
Yet, for Boswell, this "heterosexual" definition of marriage is the
"[l]ove that dares not speak its name."226
Thus, Eskridge was on notice to check the primary sources before re-
peating the characterizations of Boswell. Careful examination of those
sources is sufficient to conclude that, far from being "commonplace" in
the Roman Empire, same-sex marriage was viewed as a contradiction in
terms, an object of ridicule and indignation by all the pagan authors,
even prior to the prevalence of Christian ideas of marriage. While it
would be overstating the evidence to say that the idea was "unheard of,"
it was certainly viewed as unnatural and dysfunctional.
Take the "same-sex marriages" of Rome's emperors, which Eskridge
calls the "best documented" historical instances of the phenomenon.27
"The marriages of emperors such as Nero stand as examples of publicly
celebrated same-sex marriages in [imperial Rome]."m  The following
passage constitutes his entire discussion of the three historical instances
of same-sex marriages by Roman emperors, two by Nero and one by
Elagabalus:
Roman historian Suetonius reported, disapprovingly, that
the first-century emperor Nero "went through a wedding cere-
mony with [Sporus]-dowry, bridal veil and all-which the
whole Court attended; then brought him home and treated him
223. 2 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 23.2.1, cited in BOSWELL, supra note 10, at 49 n.88.
224. See id.
225. 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 1.1.1 (Alan Watson ed. & trans., 1985) [hereinafter
1 DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN].
226. THE THREE TRIALS OF OSCAR WILDE 236 (H. Montgomery Hyde ed., 1956).
227. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 22.
22& Id. at 23.
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as a wife. He dressed Sporus in fine clothes normally worn by
an Empress and took him in his own litter not only to every
Greek assize and fair, but actually through the Street of Images
at Rome, kissing him amorously now and then." Later, a
freedman, Pythagorus, "married [Nero]-just as he himself had
married Sporus-and on his wedding night he imitated the
screams and moans of a girl being deflowered." Dio Cassius, a
historian and contemporary of Suetonius, confirmed Nero's
marriages to these men and also provided a reliable account of
the same-sex and opposite-sex marriages of third-century em-
peror Elagabalus. Indeed, it was said that men seeking ad-
vancement in Elagabalus's imperial court rushed to marry other
men to curry favor with the emperor."'
This matter-of-fact narrative notes only that Suetonius disapproved of
the same-sex marriages of Nero. Perhaps it is instructive to quote di-
rectly in full the primary sources cited by Eskridge to understand the full
context and flavor of how these imperial ceremonies were viewed in pa-
gan antiquity.
Suetonius, in his The Lives of the Twelve Caesars, deals with Nero's
same-sex marriages in the section dealing with his "shameful and crimi-
nal deeds." Writing that "[l]ittle by little, however, as his vices grew
stronger, he dropped jesting and secrecy and with no attempt at disguise
openly broke out into worse crime. '" ° Suetonius explained that:
Besides abusing freeborn boys and seducing married women,
he debauched the Vestal Virgin Rubria. The freedwoman Acte
he all but made his lawful wife, after bribing some ex-consuls to
perjure themselves by swearing that she was of royal birth. He
castrated the boy Sporus and actually tried to make a woman of
him. He married him with all the usual ceremonies, including a
dowry and a bridal veil, took him to his house attended by a
great throng, and treated him as his wife. And the witty jest
that some one made is still current, that it would have been well
for the world if Nero's father Domitius had had that kind of
wife. This Sporus, decked out with the finery of the Empresses
and riding in a litter, he took with him to the assizes and marts
of Greece, and later at Rome through the Street of the Images,
fondly kissing him from time to time. That he even desired il-
licit relations with his own mother, and was kept from it by her
enemies, who feared that such a relationship might give the
reckless and insolent woman too great influence, was notorious,
229. Id. at 22 (footnotes omitted).
230. SUETONIus, THE LIVES OF THE TWELVE CAESARS 258 (Joseph Gavorse ed. &
trans., 1931).
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especially after he added to his concubines a courtesan who was
said to look very like Agrippina. Even before that, so they say,
whenever he rode in a litter with his mother, he had incestuous
relations with her, which were betrayed by the stains on his
clothing.
He so prostituted his own chastity that after defiling almost
every part of his body, he at last devised a kind of game, in
which, covered with the skin of some wild animal, he was let
loose from a cage and attacked the private parts of men and
women, who were bound to stakes, and when he had sated his
mad lust, was dispatched by his freedman Doryphorus. For he
was even married to this man in the same way that he himself
had married Sporus, going so far as to imitate the cries and
lamentations of a maiden being deflowered.2'
Using such a monstrous figure as a poster-boy for same-sex marriage is
ridiculous. According to the leading commentator, K.R. Bradley, in
Suetonius' Life of Nero: An Historical Commentary,2 2 "[m]ention of spe-
cific elements of a normal marriage ceremony is certainly intended by
Suetonius to heighten the outrageousness of Neronian libido in general
and the present episode in particular." 3 Bradley also indicates that "[i]t
appears probable ... that Suetonius has confused Doryphorus and Py-
thagoras,"' ' 4 who was correctly identified in the account of Tacitus:
Nero, who polluted himself by every lawful or lawless indul-
gence, had not omitted a single abomination which could
heighten his depravity, till a few days afterwards he stooped to
marry himself to one of that filthy herd, by name Pythagoras,
with all the forms of regular wedlock. The bridal veil was put
over the emperor; people saw the witnesses of the ceremony,
the wedding dower, the couch and the nuptial torches; every-
thing in a word was glainly visible, which, even when a woman
weds darkness hides.
So Tacitus was as "disapproving" as Suetonius. He continues: "A dis-
aster followed," and goes on to describe the burning of Rome.236 Do
these historians think that Nero's same-sex weddings were "common-
place"? What about Dio Cassius?
231. Id. at 258-59 (footnote omitted).
232. K.R. BRADLEY, SUETONIUS' LIFE OF NERO: AN HISTORICAL COMMENTARY
(1978).
233. Id. at 161-62.
234. Id. at 165.
235. THE COMPLETE WORKS OF TACITUS 376 (Alfred John Church & William Jack-
son Brodribb trans. and Moses Hadas ed., 1942).
236. Id
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[L]ater he caused a boy of the freedmen, whom he used to
call Sporus, to be castrated, since he, too, resembled Sabina and
he used him in every way like a wife. In due time, though al-
ready "married" to Pythagoras, a freedman, he formally "mar-
ried" Sporus, and assigned the boy a regular dowry according to
contract; and the Romans as well as others publicly celebrated
their wedding.
While Nero had Sporus, the eunuch, as a wife, one of his as-
sociates in Rome, who had made a study of philosophy, on be-
ing asked whether the marriage and cohabitation in question
met with his approval, replied: "You do well, Caesar, to seek
the company of such wives. Would that your father had had the
same ambition and had lived with a similar consort! "-indicat-
ing that if this had been the case, Nero would not have been
born, and the state would now be free of great evils. 37
Later on, Dio Cassius continues:
Now Nero called Sporus "Sabina" not merely because, owing
to his resemblance to her he had been made a eunuch, but be-
cause the boy, like the mistress, had been solemnly married to
him in Greece, Tigellinus giving the bride away, as the law or-
dained. All the Greeks held a celebration in honour of their
marriage, uttering all the customary good wishes, even to the
extent of praying that legitimate children might be born to
them. 38
Eskridge comments in a footnote: "Dio was not amused."239 The Ro-
man historian furthered explained:
After that Nero had two bedfellows at once, Pythagoras to
play the rfle of husband to him, and Sporus that of wife. The
latter, in addition to other forms of address, was termed "lady,"
"queen," and "mistress." Yet why should one wonder at this,
seeing that Nero would fasten naked boys and girls to stakes,
and then putting on the hide of a wild beast would attack them
and satisfy his brutal lust under the appearance of devouring
parts of their bodies? Such were the indecencies of Nero.
When he received the senators, he wore a short flowered tu-
nic and a muslin neck-cloth; for in matters of dress, also he was
already transgressing custom, even going so far as to wear un-
girded tunics in public.2
237. 8 Dio's ROMAN HISTORY 135, 137 (Earnest Cary trans., 1968).
238. Id. at 159.
239. ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 22 n.19.
240. 8 Dio's ROMAN HISTORY, supra note 237, at 159.
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Whatever his sense of humor, Dio Cassius certainly did not find such
behavior "commonplace."
Professor Eskridge vouches for Dio Cassius's account of "the same-sex
and opposite-sex marriages of third-century emperor Elagabalus." 241 He
finds it "reliable." 24 Dio Cassius's account is introduced by explaining
that Elagabalus:
who saw fit to make even the gods cohabit under due form of
marriage, lived most licentiously himself from first to last. He
married many women, and had intercourse with even more
without any legal sanction; yet it was not that he had any need
of them himself, but simply that he wanted to imitate their ac-
tions when he should lie with his lovers and wanted to get ac-
complices in his wantonness by associating with them indis-
criminately. He used his body both for doing and allowing
many strange things, which no one could endure to tell or hear
of.
243
The ultimate illustration of this turns out to be the same-sex marriage
of Elagabalus:
And finally... he was bestowed in marriage and was termed
wife, mistress, and queen. He worked with wool, sometimes
wore a hair-net, and painted his eyes, daubing them with white
lead and alkanet. Once, indeed, he shaved his chin and held a
festival to mark the event; but after that he had the hairs
plucked out, so as to look more like a woman. And he often re-
clined while receiving the salutations of the senators. The hus-
band of this woman was Hierocles, a Carian slave, once the fa-
vourite of Gordius, from whom he had learned to drive a
chariot.24
Decency suggests that the catalog of Elagabalus's sexual sins be sum-
marized. Edward Gibbon, the famous chronicler of Rome's decline, puts
it as follows:
A long train of concubines, and a rapid succession of wives,
among whom was a vestal virgin, ravished by force from her sa-
cred asylum, were insufficient to satisfy the impotence of [Ela-
gabalus's] passions. The master of the Roman world affected to
copy the dress and manners of the female sex, preferred the dis-
taff to the sceptre, and dishonoured the principal dignities of
the empire by distributing them among his numerous lovers;
241. ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 22.
242. Id.
243. 9 Dio's ROMAN HISTORY 461 (Earnest Cary trans., 1961).
244. Id. at 465,467.
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one of whom was publicly invested with the title and authority
of the emperor's, or, as he more properly styled himself, of the
empress's husband.2 45
Gibbon also explained that "[a] dancer was made praefect of the city, a
charioteer praefect of the watch, a barber praefect of the provisions.
These three ministers, with many inferior officers, were all recom-
mended, enormitate membrorum." Gibbons also noted: "It may seem
probable, the vices and follies of Elagabalus have been adorned by fancy,
and blackened by prejudice. Yet confining ourselves to the public scenes
displayed before the Roman people, and attested by grave and contem-
porary historians, their inexpressible infamy surpasses that of any other
age or country." 47 Needless to say, if one were searching for arguments
in support of same-sex marriage, perhaps one could look better else-
where.
Professor Eskridge cites the Historiae Augustae for the proposition
that "[i]ndeed, it was said that men seeking advancement in Elagabalus's
imperial court rushed to marry other men to curry favor with the em-
peror., 24 What the primary source actually states, however, is this:
His courtiers, moreover, were men of depraved life, some of
them old men looking like philosophers, who would do up their
hair in nets, declare that they were living a life of depravity, and
boast that they had husbands. Some say, however, that they
only made a pretence of this in order that by counterfeiting the
Emperor's vices they might stand higher in his favour.249
Not only does the author of the Historiae Augustae express strong dis-
approval, but he pointedly questions whether such "marriages" actually
occurred.m0 The skeptical, critical note in the source is completely miss-
ing from Eskridge's recounting.
Lampridius introduces his life of Elagabalus by saying: "I should never
have put [it] in writing-hoping that it might not be known that he was
emperor of the Romans-were it not that before him this same imperial
office had had a Caligula, a Nero, and a Vitellius," and then goes on to
record that these emperors "were murdered, dragged through the streets,
officially called tyrants, and no man wishes to mention even their
245. EDWARD GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN
EMPIRE 168 (David Womersley ed., 1994) (footnotes omitted).
246. Id. at 168 n.59.
247. Id. at 168.
248. ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 22 n.21 (citing 2 THE SCRIPTORES HISTORIAE
AUGUSTAE 129, 131 (London: W. Heinemann, 1922-1932)).
249. 2 THE SCRIPTORES HISTORIAE AUGUSTAE 129, 131 (David Magie, trans. 1924).
250. See id.
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names.""' No one, that is, except Boswell and Eskridge.
There is a better reason, however, why evidence regarding the practice
of Roman emperors cannot be used as legal precedent. Roman law was
quite clear that the emperor was above the law. Princeps legibus solutus
est. "The emperor is not bound by statutes."'2  Whether the subject is
adultery, incest, polygamy, or parricide, emperors often circumvented
the general law.
Eskridge then widens his scope outside the imperial household. 23 He
notes that "[o]ther evidence indicates that same-sex marriages were not
limited to Rome's emperors. The satirists Martial and Juvenal sarcasti-
cally noted the casual way in which men married other men by the end of
the first century., 214 Boswell too characterizes Juvenal as establishing
that same-sex marriage ceremonies had become "absolutely common-
place." 25 Same-sex marriage achieved "casual and accepting reception
by [Juvenal's] contemporaries." 6 Indeed, Eskridge claims that Juvenal,
Martial, and the romantic novel Babylonica "do not exclude the possi-
bility that same-sex marriages were culturally or legally distinct from dif-
ferent-sex marriages, but they confirm the acceptance of same-sex unions
in imperial Rome." 27  This is an astonishing claim, since these very
sources, particularly Juvenal, establish that the idea of same-sex marriage
was viewed as ludicrous by contemporary Romans: "'I have a ceremony
to attend tomorrow morning in the Quirinial valley,' says the interlocutor
in Juvenal's Satires. 'What sort of ceremony?' he is asked. The reply:
'Nothing special: a friend is marrying another man and a small group is
attending." '28
These lines from a satire establish the "casual" acceptance of same-sex
marriage only when the genre and the lines that come both before and
after are ignored. The humor here depends upon the "casual" reference
to same-sex marriage, since the very notion is viewed as outrageous. As
251. Id. at 105.
252. 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 225, at 1.3.31; see also 3 THE DIGEST OF
JUSTINIAN (Alan Watson ed. & trans., 1985), at 32.1.23 ("[It is proper that so great a
majesty should observe the laws from which he is deemed to be himself exempt.");
KENNETH PENNINGTON, THE PRINCE AND THE LAW, 1200-1600: SOVEREIGNTY AND
RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 78 (1993) (noting that a Roman prince was
not subject to legal mandates).
253. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 31.
254. Id. at 22-23.
255. See BOSWELL, supra note 10, at 81.
256. Id. at 82.
257. ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 23.
258. Id. at 23.
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one recent commentator notes, "the casualness of the question (no more
emphatic than Eng. 'Oh,. . .') suggests that what follows will be run-of-
the-mill, ordinary, conventional. What follows is therefore the more
shocking.""
What precedes is also shocking:
Four hundred thousand is the size of the dowry given by
Gracchus to a comet player (or perhaps his horn was the
straight variety). The contract is signed, the blessing pro-
nounced, a numerous party is waiting; the newly-wed 'bride' re-
clines in the lap of her husband. Shades of our forefathers! Is it
a censor we need, or an augur? Would you feel more horror, or
think it more appalling a portent, if a woman dropped a calf, or
a cow gave birth to a lamb? A long dress with veil and flounces
is worn by a man who carried a sacred shield of Mars by its mys-
tic thong, sweating beneath the swaying burden. Father of our
city, from where did such evil come to your Latin shepherds?
From where did this itch arise, o Lord of War, to plague your
descendants? Look-a man of family and fortune-being wed
to a man! Do you not shake your helmet or bang the ground
with your spear, or complain to your father? Away, then; quit
the strenuous acres of that great Park which you have forgot-
ten.2"
Only at that point does Juvenal provide the passage that Eskridge
quotes.26' The most recent scholarly commentary indicates that "A mon-
strum is an unnatural thing or event: hence a portent, prodigy, freak, hor-
ror, atrocity." 62 So much for the notion of casual acceptance of same-sex
marriage. After Eskridge's quoted passage, Juvenal continues:
Such things, before we're very much older, will be done in
public-in public, and will want to appear in the papers! These
brides, however, are racked by one intractable problem: they
cannot conceive, and hold their husbands by having a baby. It
is well that Nature has given no power to their twisted emotions
over their bodies. They die without issue. For them no assis-
tance can be had from the bloated Lyde with her box of fertility
drugs, nor does it help to proffer their hands to the running Lu-
perc26
This language does not evince casual acceptance, or even toleration.
259. 1 JUVENAL: SATIRES 157 (Susanna Morton Braund ed., 1996).
260. JUVENAL: THE SATIRES 13 (Niall Rudd trans., 1992).
261. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 23.
262. 1 JUVENAL: SATIRES, supra note 259, at 155.
263. JUVENAL: THE SATIRES, supra note 260, at 13.
1320 [Vol. 47:1271
Follow the Footnote or the Advocate
The language does, however, resemble that used by Martial, another
contemporary Roman satirist, in language also omitted by Eskridge.26
Eskridge says, "Martial described the marriage of 'bearded Callistratus'
to the 'brawny Afer,' complete with torches, wedding veil, songs, and
dower. 2 65 Boswell gives the full text:
The bearded Callistratus married the rugged Afer
Under the same law by which a woman takes a husband.
Torches were carried before him, a bridal veil covered his face,
Nor was the hymn to you, 0 god of marriage, omitted.
A dowry was even agreed on. Does this not, Rome, seem
Enough? Do you expect him also to bear a child?266
In other words, Eskridge missed the point. The humor of the epigram
lies in the question at the end about the barrenness of same-sex mar-
riages.
Does the Babylonica "confirm the acceptance of same-sex marriages in
imperial Rome"?2 67 Hardly. It is a novel set in Egypt. The paraphrase
by the patriarch Photius in the ninth century, which is our only source
since the original is lost,268 says that it has "a digression about Berenice,
the daughter of the king of Egypt, and her wild and inordinate passions,
and how she slept with Mesopotamia .... Berenice married Mesopota-
mia, and there was war between Garmos and Berenice on account of
Mesopotamia. ''16 Eskridge omits the reference to Berenice's "wild and
inordinate passions." Even Boswell admits that "Roman and Greek
writers appear to have found lesbianism peculiar, even when they ac-
cepted male homosexuality as ordinary."70  Indeed, it turns out the
French editor and translator of Photius translates the Greek word which
Boswell terms "inordinate" as "contre nature" or "unnatural."27' Indeed,
there is a similar dispute between Henry, the French translator, and
Boswell, the historian, about whether the Greek means that Berenice
married Mesopotamia, or, more literally, celebrated the marriage of
Mesopotamia (to someone else?).272 In any case, the focus is on fiction,
264. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 23.
265. Id.
266. BOSWELL, supra note 8, at 80 (quoting Martial 12.42) (footnotes omitted).
267. ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 23.
268. See BOSWELL, supra note 8, at 84.
269. BOSWELL, supra note 8, at 82; see also BOSWELL, supra note 10, at 84 (quoting
the same text but with a slightly altered translation).
270. BOSWELL, supra note 10, at 82 n.150.
271. BOSWELL, supra note 8, at 84 n.113.
272. See id. at 84 n.114.
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not history.
Ovid, in his Metamorphoses, tells the tale of Iphis, a young girl who
was raised as a boy because her father wanted a son.2 73 Her true sex was
concealed from her father, who engaged her at age thirteen to a girl of
equal age.274 Ovid writes that:
But what of Iphis? She, with heartache sore,
Despairing love's fulfillment, loved the more;
And, doting so, a maiden on a maid,
Could scarce refrain from weeping, as she said:
".... . Surely the gods, if 'twas their true intent
To spare me, should have spared this chastisement;
Or else have given me, if they wished to kill,
At least some known disease, some natural ill.
Does mare love mare, does heifer heifer woo?
Hind goes with hart, and with the ram the ewe.
So mate the birds, and nowhere will you find
The female loves the female of her kind.
Would I had not been born! But doubtless Crete
Which breeds perversions, wants the list complete....
Seek what is lawful! love as woman may! ...
Nature forbids the love for which you sigh,...
For vainly Juno o'er a rite presides,
Which lacks a bridegroom-where we both are brides.
275
The tale has a happy ending, when Iphis is miraculously metamor-
phized into a male. 6 Contrary to Eskridge, the pagan Roman sources
demonstrate in abundance that same-sex marriage, far from being
viewed as commonplace or casually accepted, was actually viewed as un-
natural and dysfunctional.
XIII. EVERY MAN HIS OWN BOSWELL
Professor Eskridge's attempt to enroll history in his brief for same-sex
marriage is hardly unusual. It is one more worrisome example of the
273. THE METAMORPHOSES OF OVID 213-15 (A.E. Watts trans., 1954); see also 6-10
OVID'S METAMORPHOSES 124-27 (William S. Anderson ed., 1972) (providing the original
Latin text).
274. See THE METAMORPHOSES OF OVID, supra note 273, at 213.
275. See id. at 213-15.
276. See id. at 215.
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misuse of history in order to achieve a desired result. Ignorance of, and
indifference to, history are not limited to the young. Once a concern in
the high schools, and then in colleges, it is now in graduate schools, and
in graduates themselves, that both such ignorance and such indifference
are displayed.
Professor Eskridge distances himself from John Boswell and that late
author's distressing display, by now too well known to be overlooked, of
vulgar and other errors. 7  But the motto of the moment apparently re-
mains, among many advocates of same-sex marriage: Every Man His
Own Boswell. The omissions, distortions, misstatements in his second
"historical" chapter in The Case for Same Sex Marriage are presented in
so ostentiously dispassionate a manner that the unwary reader is likely to
be led astray. And even if that reader feels that something is amiss, it is
unlikely that he will take upon himself the task of checking virtually
every authority cited by Eskridge, from the Hittites onward. The under-
standable human reaction is simply to accept most of it, possibly with a
vague feeling of unease, but otherwise to be helplessly susceptible to
their falsifications. A professor of law, an authority on statutory inter-
pretation-might he, could he, would he, amidst all the paraphrenalia of
scrupulosity (those footnotes, those rhetorical acts of modifying nuance),
misinterpret history?
Though here we feel compelled to borrow Molly Bloom's celebrated
three yesses, such an answer can be delivered with full-throated ease only
after one has taken on the task of running each of Eskridge's authorities
to ground, a task both tiresome and pedestrian. This article attempts to
perform this task in the belief that this particular case is a representative
one, that in many areas of controversy this kind of thing goes on, un-
checked, and that it is always worthwhile to make playing fast and loose
with history just a bit harder than it might otherwise be.
Furthermore, one would have thought that readers of Eskridge's sum-
mary of history, though they might not have detected every error, would
have been hesitant to endorse it after the Boswellian embarrassment.
Not true. Judge Posner, for example, who likes to think of himself as
both skeptical and hard to please, has described The Case for Same-Sex
Marriage as "a work of deep and scrupulous ... scholarship," its tone
"unstrident" and "unpolemical," a "model of advocacy scholarship" by
"a careful scholar" whose "canvass of historical materials is impressively
277. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 223 n.37 ("[Ilts main charge, that Boswell over-
reads or misreads some or many of his sources, strikes me as just. It is a charge that has
been repeatedly and persuasively made against Boswell's earlier work.").
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thorough" despite a few "mistakes of detail." '278 If Judge Posner can be
so taken in, what hope is there for the common reader to withstand the
self-assurance, the feigned modesty, the rhetorical blandishments, and
the slyness of Eskridge's version of history?
The question is not academic. Eskridge's historical abuses have had
consequences. His first foray into the field was his work on the Appel-
lants' Brief in the case of Dean v. District of Columbia in 1992.279 It was
Eskridge who supplied the "Plaintiffs History of Same-Sex Marriage,"
which is summarized in the Appellant's Brief:
There is nothing new about same-sex marriage. Throughout
human history-in ancient Egypt and Babylonia, Plaintiffs His-
tory of Same-Sex Marriage at 3-6; in the Hittite Laws, id. at 6-8;
in classical Greece, id. at 8-12; in Republican and Imperial
Rome, id. at 13-15; in the overwhelming majority of the Native
cultures of the Americas and Australia, id. at 18-24; in most Af-
rican and Asian cultures; id. at 24-35; and in the Western Chris-
tian tradition, id. at 38-42, 46-53-marriage has included same-
sex relationships.
We realize that the rich history of same-sex marriage that we
have uncovered may be surprising to some, but that is only be-
cause the tradition of same-sex marriage has been suppressed in
recent Western history, and is only now coming to light. An-
other lesson of our history of same-sex marriage is that the re-
sistance of Western culture to same-sex marriage in recent cen-
turies rests upon anti-homosexual bigotry.2w
Nothing asserted here is accurate. There is no "rich history of same-
sex marriage" that he has "uncovered," that was "suppressed in recent
Western history, and is only now coming to light." The "resistance" to
same-sex marriage is not limited to "Western culture" with its age-old
"anti-homosexual hysteria and bigotry," but extends to almost every cul-
ture throughout the world, including even those, such as Tahiti, that pro-
vide an officially sanctioned social role for homosexuals, but do not ex-
tend society's official approval to same-sex marriages. Yet in an
important case in 1992, Eskridge's "history" made, in a potted form, its
first blithe appearance. Having acquired a baseless plausibility, it con-
tinues to be referred to, and to be employed to the same effect, in propa-
gandistic journalism, and in cases before the courts. If you seek Esk-
278. Richard A. Posner, Should There Be Homosexual Marriage? And If So, Who
Should Decide? 95 MICH. L. REV. 1578 (1997).
279. See Brief for Appellants, Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. App.
1995) (No. 92 Civ. 737).
280. Id. at 32-33.
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ridge's monument, look around.2'
281. See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. App. 1995). The latest such
example involves three similar cases currently before the Vermont Supreme Court: Baker
v. Vermont; Beck v. Vermont; Farnham v. Vermont. These cases have been consolidated.
See Baker v. Vermont, No. S1009-97CNC (Vt. filed Nov. 25, 1997). In the Plaintiffs'
Memorandum of Law, the section entitled "Historical and Sociological Research Belie the
Claim that Tradition Unequivocally Favors Heterosexual-Only Marriage" asserts that "re-
cently published historical materials demonstrate that marriages, or marriage-like rela-
tionships, have been recognized and supported between people of the same gender
throughout human history." These materials include one Virginia Law Review article and
a book that contains a chapter on the "history" of same-sex marriage. Both are by Wil-
liam J. Eskridge, Jr.
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